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The Missoulian’s Coverage o f  the Northern Tier Pipeline (82 pp.) 
Director: Charles E'. Hood
This thesis analyzes coverage that the Missoulian— a 33,000 
circulation daily— gave the Northern Tier pipeline issue. The 
analysis covers 1979 and 1980, when the pipeline company was 
particularly active in Montana. The aim of the study was to 
determine (1) how thorough the paper's coverage was and (2) if 
any inaccuracies or gaps in coverage had similar causes.
The Northern Tie r  pipeline was a proposal introduced in 1975 to 
build an oil port at Port Angeles, Wash, and a pipeline connecting 
it to Clearbrook, Minn. The route crossed the length o f  Montana. 
Northern Ti e r  was a complex, plastic issue which generated much 
controversy. A  lot of conflicting information was available and 
the polemics o f  the project's backers and detractors were 
plentiful. This made clear reporting difficult.
. Results of this study show that many deficiencies in coverage 
were caused by the passive approach the paper took in gathering 
and displaying information. Indicative of this passive approach 
was the scarcity o f  depth and explanatory reporting. As a 
result, some pertinent aspects o f  the issue were not followed 
well in the paper's pages, and some confusing matters--particularly 
the pipeline's need— were not explained. Thus, although the 
Missoulian reported copiously about the subject, its readers often 
were ill-informed.
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PREFACE
In the twentieth century man became nature's rival as director 
of the environment. The tools and techniques to move mountains and
rivers, denude forests, dry swamps, irrigate deserts and create n e w .
chemicals became practical during this century. Comparatively, 80 
years ago we were in the dark ages of communication technology, 
transportation, agriculture, energy production and corporate 
development.
At the beginning of this century, removing 268 million cubic 
yards of material for the Panama Canal required four decades and the 
cooperation and financial backing of two countries. In the last 
three years the Bechtel Group Inc. has moved almost twice that amount 
of sand and rock just in preliminary efforts to construct Jubail, a 
planned city for 700,000 in Saudi A r a b i a . 1
Today man helps determine how acidic the rain will be, how 
much arsenic ground water will contain and how many parts per 
million of lead the air will carry. In much of the world, risk 
levels for cancer, mental retardation, heart disease and infant 
mortality are set as much by man as by providence.
There are three consequences of the great expansion of man's 
influence on his world, relevant to the news media:
iTime, July 12, 1982.
V
1. Local news no longer is generated within a community only. 
Decisions by boards in Southern California affect stream and river 
flows in neighboring states. Japan's energy policy influences coal 
production in Montana, Colorado and U t a h . 1 And, as will be seen, the 
need for the Northern Tier pipeline was determined by actions taken
in Canada, Mexico, Alaska and Washington, D.C., not in any of the 
states the pipeline was designed to cross.
2. The potential adverse impacts of man's activities have 
become more severe. Deforestation of the Amazon, which could be 
complete by the y e a r  2000, may shift global weather patterns, drying 
entire agricultural r e g i o n s . 2
3. Because building a pipeline, power!ine, dam or strip mine 
is simpler today, their needs can be less obvious and dire than when 
they were feats that taxed man's abilities. Projects such as the 
Tellico Dam, Tennessee and Tombigbee waterway project and Clinch River 
breeder reactor are undertaken despite serious doubts about their needs
The need for an informed public never has been greater, but 
many issues today are camouflaged in complexity. Information about a 
particular project may be contradictory, highly technical or unavailabl 
There may be disagreements among experts, and questions for some (such 
as benefits versus costs); the answers may be based on personal 
judgment rather than empirical data. Yet newsmen must try to
1Montana International Trade Commission, Investigation of the 
Pacific Basin Market for Western U.S. Steam Coal as a Case Example: 
Final Report, Feb., 1980.
2Science News, 118, Oct. 4, 1980.
present an accurate, complete view of any project. The public depends 
on them.
This thesis examines coverage a medium-sized daily paper gave 
a confusing, massive project called the Northern Tier pipeline. The 
paper is the Missou.li.an— 33,000 circulation--published in Missoula, 
Mont. This study focused on selected permitting procedures in Montana 
and the question o f  the need for the pipeline. Because the need for 
the pipeline was a complex issue on which there was little agreement, 
it is discussed in depth before the description of the paper's 
coverage.
CHAPTER I
THE NORTHERN TIER PIPELINE
The concept of a West Coast to inland crude oil pipeline was 
inspired by three events in the early 1970s:
1. In 1974 the Canadian government announced plans to phase 
out its crude oil exports to the United States. Most of those exports 
were slated for the Northern Tier r e g i o n . 1
2. In 1972 the largest crude oil reservoir y et found in the 
Western Hemisphere was discoverd at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's North 
Slope.
3. In 1973 the OPEC oil embargo made reducing the dependence
/
of the United States on foreign oil a national concern, moving the 
U.S. Congress to decree that no Alaskan oil could be sold to foreign 
countries.
Canada supplied 45 percent o f  the imported oil used in the 
United States in the early 1970s. Some American refineries using 
Canadian oil had alternative sources. Those in Illinois, Indiana and 
Ohio, for example, could receive oil through pipelines from the 
Midwest and Gulf Coast. Refineries around Puget Sound were accessible 
to ocean tankers. Apparently refineries in Montana, North Dakota and 
Minnesota had no alternative to the Canadian oil.
xThe Northern Tier states are Washington, Oregon, Idaho, 
Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, 
Indiana and Ohio.
1
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TABLE 1 
DEFICIT PROJECTIONS*
State
Year
1985 1990 2000
Minnesota -90f 1 CO cn
j
-50
Montana -40 -40 -60
North Dakota t5* - 5 -50
•kThousands of barrels a day.
'A minus number indicates a deficit.
^A positive number indicates a surplus
S o u r c e :
U.S. Department of Interior, West to East Crude Oil 
Transportation Systems (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1979), p. 19.
Various projections have been made concerning the regional 
shortage o f  crude oil. Table 1 gives Department of Interior figures 
published in July 1979.
A pipeline could have been built from the extensive 
Midcontinent pipeline system to Montana, connecting refineries in 
Minnesota and North Dakota along the way, but the vast quantity of 
Alaskan oil bypassing the West Coast seemed, to many, a more ready 
and logical source. West Coast refineries could not use all of 
Alaska's daily production. In early 1979 West Coast refineries used
3
about 72 percent of the 1.2 million barrels of oil Alaska was producing 
each d a y . 1 The bulk of the remaining oil was shipped through the 
Panama Canal to the Gulf Coast, where some of it entered pipelines 
feeding the Midwest and East. The Alaskan oil not sold on the West 
Coast was considered surplus and was labeled the West Coast Glut. Yet 
the oil wasn't surplus in the sense that it wasn't being used; it was 
used. But the trans-Panama route was expensive, adding about $2 per 
barrel to shipping costs. When crude oil prices were l ow— in 1979 
Alaskan oil was selling for about $14 a barrel— this $2 was a 
substantial slice in oil company p r o f i t s . 2
The Northern Tier pipeline was one of four pipeline systems 
proposed to cut the shipping cost and deliver the oil to the Northern 
Tier region of the United States. Northern Tier's plan was to build 
an oil port at Port Angeles, Wash, and about 1,500 miles of large 
diameter pipeline to Clearbrook, Minn. Initial capacity could reach
709,000 barrels a day. Later, additional pumping stations could be 
added to bring daily capacity to almost one million barrels.
Northern Tier was a consortium incorporated in Montana in 
November 1975. Its original stockholders included the Curran Oil 
Company (Great Falls, Mont.), the Burlington Northern Railroad 
Company, the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad
1U.S., Department of Interior, West to East Crude Oil 
Transportation Systems (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1979).
2Arlon Tussing, "The Proposed Northern Tier Pipeline: Its
Economics and its Alternatives," unpublished statement presented to 
the Committee on Energy and Utilities, Washington State House of 
Representatives, April 16, 1979, p. 4.
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Company and Western Crude Oil (Denver, C o l o . ) - 1 In October 1977 the 
U.S. Steel Company joined the group. In March 1979 Westinghouse 
Pipeline Company also became a Northern Tier partner and in May 1979 
the Farmers' Union Central Exchange, Inc. joined the co n s o r t i u m . 2 
The Getty Oil Company, the last to join, acquired a 64 percent 
interest in June 19 8 2 . 3
The Northern Tier Pipeline Company, which had spent about 
$50 million by the beginning of 1982,4 concentrated on acquiring the 
necessary federal, state and local permits and licenses needed for 
construction. Three other pipeline proposals were advanced by the 
Northwest Energy Company, the Kitimat Pipe Line Ltd. and the Trans 
Mountain Oil Pipeline Company. All the plans, while differing in 
mode, had the same end: delivering Alaskan oil to Midwestern and
Northern Tier refineries.
The Northwest Energy Company proposed the construction of an 
oil port at Skagway, Alaska, and a 710-mile pipeline to the Keg 
River in Alberta, Canada. From there the pipeline would connect with 
an existing pipeline that would carry the oil to the United States. 
Kitimat's plan called for construction of an oil port near Kitimat, 
British Columbia, and about 500 miles of pipeline to Edmonton,
Baines R. Hodge, unpublished prefiled testimony presented at 
the Washington State Energy Site Evaluation Council, Nov. 19, 1979.
2Ibid.
3Spokesman Review, Spokane, Wash., June 23, 1982.
M̂issoulian, Missoula, Mont., April 9, 1982.
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Alberta. There it, too, would connect to an existing pipeline that 
would carry the crude oil to the United States. The Trans Mountain 
Oil Pipeline proposal called for an oil port at Low Point, W a s h . —  
about 18 miles west of Port A n g e l e s — and about 800 miles of pipeline 
emptying into the pipeline at Edmonton. For any of those pipelines 
to serve refineries in Montana, a 150-mile spur would have had to be 
built connecting the line at Edmonton to the Rangeland Pipeline 
which starts in Rimbey, A l b e r t a . 1
Each of those pipelines bid for special federal consideration 
mandated by an amendment tacked onto the Public Utility Regulatory 
Act of 1978. Title V of that act required the Secretary of Interior 
to establish an accelerated schedule for reviewing each proposal, 
then recommending to the President which if any pipeline should be 
built. The President then would decide which pipeline would have 
precedence for federal permits. Because the chosen pipeline would 
be first in line for federal processing, its competitors would be 
at a fatal disadvantage.
On October 15, 1979 Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus 
recommended that Northern Tier be given the President's b l essing.2 
On January 17, 1980 President Carter accepted that recommendation, 
effectively eliminating Northern Tier's c o m p e t i t o r s . 3 Over the
xIf one of the three trans-Canada pipelines were built, the 
Rangeland Pipeline Company was expected to build this section of line 
(U.S., Department of Interior, West to East Crude Oil, op. cit.
2Missoulian, Oct. 16, 1979.
3Ibid., Jan. 18, 1980.
next yea r  and one half, the pipeline company had fairly smooth sailing 
through the permitting processes of Montana, North Dakota and 
Minnesota. Washington state, however, was the bottleneck. In April 
1982, after six years of periodic hearings, that state denied the 
company permission to build. Without that authority, the pipeline was 
doomed. A ye a r  later, on April 20, 1983, the Northern Tier Pipeline 
Company announced that it was folding.
CHAPTER II
THE ISSUE
In 1979 and 1980 the Missoulian published the equivalent of a 
150,000-word book about the Northern Tier pipeline covering topics 
such as projected world crude oil supply and demand, international 
energy policies, pipeline and oil port safety, refinery economics, 
the physical properties o f  crude oil and fault zone patterns in 
Montana. During those two years the paper published 284 news stories, 
91 letters to the editor and 35 editorials about the pipeline. If 
the coverage had been distributed evenly over those years, Missoulian 
readers would have found mention o f  t h e  project in about two of 
every five papers. Tom Brown, Missoulian publisher, said, "Northern 
Tier received at least as much coverage as any o f  the other major 
issues at the t i m e . " 1
The pipeline deserved extensive regional coverage because 
(1) it would have been almost twice as long as the trans-Alaska 
pipeline and only slightly smaller in diam e t e r , 2 (2) it would have 
constituted one of the largest steel construction projects in United
1Personal interview with Tom Brown, Missoulian publisher, 
Missoula, Mont., April, 1982.
zThe Alaska pipeline is 798 miles long and 48 inches in 
diameter. About 700 miles of the Northern Tier pipeline would have 
been 40 inches wide and about 800 miles would have been 42 inches wide.
7
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States history, (3) it would have spanned the four major ecoregions 
in the Northwest, many major rivers and thousands of creeks and 
streams and (4) it would have skirted or touched the homes and 
communities of at least one quarter m illion p e o p l e . 1 During 
construction, silt and other contaminants would have polluted each 
body of water the pipeline crossed. Critical habitats, including 
those of bald eagles, whooping cranes, grizzly bears and black-footed 
f e r rets— all threatened or endangered species— would have been 
damaged. Property values would have declined in some areas, and the 
influx o f  pipeline workers would have disrupted many co m m u n i t i e s . 2
The many pros and cons of the project provided much ammunition 
for its supporters and detractors. Debate was plentiful and often 
heated. The main argument, of course, concerned the need for the 
pipeline.
The Need for Northern Tier
James Schlesinger, Secretary of Energy, endorsed the pipeline, 
saying, "Only the willingness of Canada to continue oil imports 
scheduled for curtailment several years ago has enabled Northern Tier 
refineries to continue o p e r a t i o n . " 3 James Edwards, President Reagan's
1U.S., Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Northern Tier Pipeline 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).
2Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, 
Facility Siting Division, Final Environmental Impact Statement: The
Northern Tier Pipeline, April, 1980.
3U.S., Department of interior, Report to the President: West
to East Crude Oil Transportation Systems (Washington, D.C.: Government
Pringint Office, 1979), p. 139.
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first Secretary of Energy, said, "The need for this pipeline has never 
been more obvious. Our national security requires a pipeline across 
o ur northern states so that Alaskan oil can move to the interior of 
our c o u n t r y . 1,1
The answer to the question of the need for a pipeline was, in 
many ways, subjective rather than scientific. The need was determined 
by a personal judgment based primarily on individual values, not 
cost/benefit assessments. Some people felt that incurring a shortage 
of petroleum products or even the possible closure of refineries did 
not outweigh the environmental risks of building the line. Others 
argued that the pipeline was needed for the jobs it would provide or 
so refineries would have an optional source of crude oil.
Title V of the Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978 listed 
15 criteria to judge the pipeline proposals. They included 
environmental risks, projected crude oil supply and demand, financial 
feasibility, capital and operating costs and safety. Most of these 
criteria were used to weigh one pipeline plan against another. Which 
was least likely to have its operation disrupted? Whiich would have 
the greatest national security advantages? Which would have the 
greatest net national economic benefits?
The criteria directly relevant to the issue of need were 
supply and demand estimates. The demand was the deficit--the amount 
o f  crude oil that Northern Tier states would be short without a new 
transportation system. The supply, many politicians assumed, was
1Seattle Times, Seattle, Wash., April 10, 1982, p. 8.
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the West Coast surplus. This was unfortunate, not only because there 
were other possible sources but because the surplus probably was too 
small to be significant.
The Surplus
Prior to the opening of the Alaska pipeline in mid-1977, West 
Coast refineries were using about one million barrels of foreign 
crude oil a day. When Alaskan oil became available, that rate was 
sliced to about one-half million barrels d a i l y . 1 In July 1979 the 
Alaska pipeline delivered an average 1.2 million barrels of oil a 
day to Valdez, its term i n u s . 2 In October 1979 the West Coast used 
about 950,000 barrels o f  Alaska's crude oil daily. The remaining 
Alaskan production was surplus or glut.
Because the U.S. Congress banned foreign sales of Alaskan
oil, the most economical markets (chiefly Japan) were eliminated.
The oil not sold to the West Coast was shipped to the Gulf Coast 
via the Panama Canal. The trans-Panama route was workable, but it 
was expensive, adding about $2 per barrel over West Coast 
d e l i v e r i e s . 3
During the first quarter of 1979, before the near doubling
of world oil prices, Alaskan oil producers could charge only about
$14 per barrel, the average price of similar foreign crude o i l . 1*
1U.S., Department of Interior, West to East Crude Oil, op. cit.
2Ibid.
3Wall Street Journal, New York, Feb. 19, 1980.
4Ibid.
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A yea r  earlier, the well-head price of Alaskan oil was only about
$11 per b a r r e l . 1 The added transportation cost to the Gulf Coast
was considered a disincentive to Alaska's oil owners. When the cost
of shipping Alaskan oil
through the. Panama Canal to the Gulf and East Coast ports . . . 
is added to the high transportation costs on the trans-Alaskan 
pipeline, the revenue left to pay for the oil itself is not 
enough to justify developing any more of the already discovered 
resources on the North Slope of Alaska.2
It was reasoned that if the owners of the Prudhoe Bay reserve 
lost $2 in profit, they might cut production in the hope that the ban 
on foreign sales would be lifted or the West Coast would start using 
more oil. To the surprise of many, however, the owners of Alaska's 
oil didn't hold back production. By 1980 oil was being withdrawn from 
Prudhoe Bay at a maximum rate of 1.5 million barrels a d a y , 3 making 
a surplus appear eminent.
One of the main areas of contention among analysts concerning 
the surplus was how big it would be. The Northern Tier Pipeline 
Company, the PACE C o m p a n yk and the Department of Energy predicted 
large increases in Alaskan oil production and, therefore, increases 
in oil surplus. The Department of Interior and others argued that 
oil production in Alaska would drop enough to eliminate the surplus.
1Arlon R. Tussing, "The Proposed Northern Tier Pipeline,"
op. cit.
2Ibid.
3Standard Oil Company, Annual Report, 1979.
1 PACE Company Consultants and Engineers, Inc. is an independent 
firm in Houston, Tex. It was hired by the pipeline company to conduct 
crude oil supply-and-demand analyses.
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The differences in the forecasts were the result of opposing 
assumptions. The Department of Interior noted,
For the Alaskan North Slope to produce at the rate the 
Department of Energy and PACE foresee, given the anticipated 
decline of the Prudhoe Bay field after 1985, means that a large 
oil field with daily production rates similar to those of 
Prudhoe Bay will have to be found and developed before 1985.
It is not at all clear from where such vast oil reserves will 
come.1
The Department of Interior reported that production would
not exceed 1.5 million barrels a day. Using the results of a study
contracted by Alaska, the department said Prudhoe Bay production 
would be maximized if daily extractions were held to that level until 
natural declines began. The firm conducting the Alaskan study, H. K. 
Poolen and Associates, predicted that between 1985 and 1995 
production would drop, from 1.5 million barrels a day to 200,0 0 0 . 2 
Largely because of the study, Alaska has set 1.5 million barrels 
as the limit to be taken from Prudhoe Bay each day.
In its 1979 annual report, the Sohio Company, which owns 54
percent of the Prudhoe Bay r e s e r v e , 3 called its North Slope holdings
a "diminishing a s s e t . " 1* Although it didn't give specific production 
forecasts, the report said current production rates would continue 
for about the next six years (until 1985), then begin tapering off.
1U.S., Department of the Interior, West to East Crude Oil, 
op. cit., p. 15.
2Ibid.
3Newsweek, Sept. 27, 1976, p. 75.
'‘Standard Oil Company, op. cit., p. 2.
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The report also called the 1.5 million barrel a day rate the "maximum 
efficient rate of pro d u c t i o n . 111
Although the glut continued to be used as a justification 
for a pipeline, its existence was brought into serious question by 
the end of 1979. On October 5, 1979 Sen. Henry Jackson sent a letter to 
Secretary of Interior Andrus expressing doubt that the surplus was 
real. Jackson, a Democrat from Washington, was chairman of the 
Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee. His staff surveyed 
West Coast refineries to learn why they weren't using more Alaskan 
crude oil. Results showed that, rather than there being too much 
Alaskan oil on the West Coast, some refineries could not buy as much 
as they wanted. After supplying figures showing how much Alaskan oil 
West Coat refineries were using, Jackson wrote,
This should not be confused with how much [Alaska North 
Slope] crude oil [Petroleum Administration for Defense District]
V refineries could use. When queried about how much more [Alaska 
North Slope] crude oil they could use, existing [Petroleum 
Administration for Defense District] V refiners reported they 
could process 181,000 more barrels per day of [Alaska North Slope] 
crude right now and could use up to 361,000 more barrels per day 
. . .  if it were available.2
Jackson also stated that three California refineries had shelved
expansion plans because more Alaskan crude oil was not available.
The owners of Prudhoe Bay oil, Jackson surmised, were saving 
enough oil for their own Gulf Coast and Midwest refineries because
1Ibid.
2Letter to Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus from Sen. Henry 
Jackson, Oct. 5, 1979. Petroleum Administration for Defense District 
is a Department of Energy classification; it covers Washington,
Oregon, California, Nevada, Arizona, Alaska and Hawaii.
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world crude oil supplies were tight and foreign oil cost more than 
their own: "Each barrel of [Alaska North Slope] crude oil delivered
on the Gulf Coast means that the producer will not have to purchase 
a barrel of imported oil which costs m o r e . " 1
Several months later the Wall Street Journal, reporting 
Jackson's findings, dismissed the glut: "With foreign supplies
limited, the producers need the Alaskan oil for their own refineries 
on the Gulf Coast and for those in the Midwest that are fed by Gulf 
p i p e lines. "2 The glut, according to the Department of Interior and 
Sohio, would not grow and probably would begin to diminish by 1985.
The sharp increases in world oil prices made the extra transportation 
cost to the Gulf Coast insignificant, and the West Coast demand for 
Alaskan oil was increasing and, therefore, providing an optional 
market for the oil. In terms of a need for the pipeline, the glut 
seems irrelevant. The deficit was, however, the crux of the issue.
The Deficit
In 1976 Forbes magazine said that "thirteen land-locked 
refineries from Minnesota to Washington . . . will be out of business 
by 1982 unless someone builds a new pipeline from the Pacific to 
supply t h e m . " 3 The Department of Energy predicted possible 
reduction in refinery operations without a new transportation system:
lIbid.
2Wall Street Journal, Feb. 19, 1980, p. 48.
3Forbes, Aug. 15, 1976, p. 23.
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Analysis shows that between 1980 and 2000, refineries in 
Montana, North Dakota [and] Minnesota . . . will not be able to 
operate at the national average because of insufficient crude 
oil supplies. In these areas, economic refinery operation may 
not be possible after 1980 without additional supplies of crude 
oil.1
Minnesota, Montana and North Dakota were believed to be the 
states most likely to have shortages of crude oil. Most predictions 
called for daily barrel shortages of about 50,000 in Montana, 5,000 
in North Dakota and 80,000 to 100,000 in Minnesota.
The Midcontinent pipeline system, with its two connections 
into the Northern Tier states in 1979, delivered primarily gasoline 
and other products to the region. Because there were no crude oil 
supply pipelines into the Northern Tier region, the area was referred 
to as landlocked. While leading energy forecasters tended to agree 
that some Northern Tier states would have crude oil shortages 
without new delivery systems, there was little agreement about the 
size of the shortages (see Table 2, p. 16).
In February 1979 the Department of Energy released a draft 
report about the future oil supply for the Northern Tier region.
Its main author was Mario Cardullo, director of the department's 
resource transportation office. The report concluded that the region 
would be short about 214,000 barrels of oil a day by the year  
2000. Many considered the report a recommendation that the Northern 
Tier pipeline not be built and the pipeline company's backers railed 
against the findings and called for a new study.
1U.S., Department of Energy, Petroleum Supply Alternatives 
for the Northern Tier and Inland States Through the Year 2000: Draft
Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 14.
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TABLE 2 
DEFICIT PROJECTIONS*
Study 1980 1985
Year
1990 2000
PACE 450 - - 900
Department of Energy (Cardullo) 109 204.2 215.4 214
Department of Energy (McGregor) 30 - 80-250 50-870
Department of Interior . - 130 130 165
* Thousands of barrels a day.
Before Cardullo's team completed the final report, another 
study was undertaken by the Department of Energy. This one assessed 
the economic benefits of a Northern Tier supply pipeline. Steve 
McGregor, director of the Office of Oil and Gas Policy at the Department 
of Energy, oversaw the study which projected deficits of up to 900,000 
barrels a day by the yea r  2000.
The McGregor study maintained that of the four proposed 
pipelines, the Northern Tier plan would provide the greatest savings 
and economic benefits to the n a t i o n . 1 Although the McGregor report, 
released July 11, 1979, did not consider nonpipeline supply 
alternatives and was not as thorough as Cardullo's study, it was the
1U.S., Department of Energy, Analysis of West-to-East 
Pipeline Applications Under Title V Public Utilities Regulatory Act 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).
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Department of Energy's official statement of a West to East pipeline. 
McGregor's study was sent to the President and Cardullo's was shelved.
On August 21, 1979 Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger made
public his department's recommendation that the Northern Tier
pipeline receive the expedited federal handling designated by Title V
of the Public Utilities Regulatory A ct of 1978. John M. Deutch,
Undersecretary of Energy, said that for
the purpose of advising the President, you should consider the 
July 11 report and August 21 memorandum [Schlesinger1s 
endorsement] as the full and final statements of the [Department 
of Energy's] findings and recommendations regarding the West-to- 
East pipeline proposals.1
The greatest difference in opinions about the size of the 
deficit was between McGregor's report and the Department of Interior's 
findings. The same month that McGregor's 900,000 barrel a day deficit 
projection was released, the Department of Interior published a 
report that stated there would be a one-half million barrel a day 
surplus in Northern Tier and Midwest states by the end of the century.
By the yea r  2000 the Department of Interior said that Montana, North 
Dakota and Minnesota would be short about 160,000 barrels a d a y — but 
this was juxtaposed with a 620,000 barrel a day surplus in neighboring 
s t a t e s . 2 (See Table 3, p. 18.) The surplus was not excess oil but 
unused transportation capacity primarily in the pipeline system 
connecting the Midwest wi t h  the Gulf Coast.
1Missoulian, Sept. 16, 1979, p. 3.
2U.S., Department of Interior, West to East Crude Oil, op.
cit.
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TABLE 3 
SUPPLY/DEMAND DIFFERENCES*
States 1985
Year
1990 2000
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio - - -
Michigan 570* 520 620
Minnesota - 90* - 85 - 50
Montana - 40 - 40 - 60
North Dakota 5 - 5 - 50
Wisconsin 50 50 60
Oregon, Washington, Idaho 55 25 - 5
Total surplus 680 605 680
Total deficits -130 -130 -165
icThousands of barrel a day.
*A positive number indicates a surplus. 
*A minus number indicates a deficit.
Source:
U.S., Department of Interior, fJest to East Crude Oil 
Transportation Systems (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1979), p. 12.
The large variations in deficit projections were caused by 
the use of widely different assumptions. To figure crude oil demand, 
the Department of Energy had, for example, to estimate population
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levels, total energy demand, automobile m i l eage and type of fuel, 
life-style changes, the price of petroleum, the effectiveness of crude 
oil distribution systems and the probable market area for oil delivered 
through new supply systems. Influencing the projections most were 
future crude oil demand and the definition of market area. In general, 
the studies that predicted large deficits assumed that the demand for 
oil would continue to increase and that the market area for any new 
transportation system would include parts of the Midwest, East and South.
A Washington State Department of Ecology study said McGregor's 
findings overstated the deficit because of "incorrect assumptions about 
the price of crude oil and petroleum p r o d u c t s , " 1 The report also said 
that if McGregor's assumptions were adjusted to reflect climbing world 
oil prices and increasing supplies to the Northern Tier region, "the 
projected Northern Tier states' deficit disappears and becomes a 
possible sur p l u s . " 2
Officials of the pipeline company based the success o f  their 
venture largely on a market area that included many non-Northern Tier 
states and on a growing demand for crude oil. In a letter to Montana 
Rep. Pat Williams, Northern Tier president Tom Kryzer said his 
company's analysis was based on, among other things, "the growth of 
demand in the market area," which included m a n y  M idwest s t a t e s . 3
1Walter J. Mead, An Economic Evaluation of the Proposed 
Northern Tier Pipeline, prepared for the Washington State Department 
of Ecology, July 24, 1980, p. 64.
2 Ibid.
3Letter from Thomas Kryzer to Montana Rep. Pat Williams,
Sept. 18, 1979, p. 8.
The department of Interior, Cardullo and Washington state 
considered only the 12 Northern Tier states in their studies. PACE, 
McGregor and the Northern Tier Pipeline Company included Midwest and 
Eastern states in their demand estimates. PACE's description of the 
pipeline's primary market area included refineries in New York, 
Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, South Dakota, Iowa, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, Nebraska and U t a h . 1
In testimony before the Department o f  Energy, Jim Hodge, a 
Northern Tier vice president, said Cardullo's deficit figures were 
low because they "failed to take into consideration an additional
600,000 barrel per day deficit into the Midcontinent s t a t e s . " 2 
Because those non-Northern Tier states already had adequate supply 
systems, to assume they soon would have crude oil shortages one had 
to expect that demand for oil would rise and that no new supply 
systems would be developed, neither would existing ones be 
expanded.
As world oil prices rose in 1979, demand began to slip. At 
the same time, other supply systems were being developed for some 
Northern Tier and Midwest states. Until the end of the 1970s, energy 
experts generally believed that demand for crude oil depended mo r e  on
1PACE Company Consultants and Engineers, Inc., An Analysis 
of the Demand Supply Factors Affecting the Twelve Northern Tier States 
Executive Summary, Aug., 1978.
2James R. Hodge, unpublished prefiled testimony presented at 
the Department of Energy hearing on its report Petroleum Supply 
Alternatives for the Northern Tier and Inland States Through the Year 
2000: Draft Report, Billings, Mont., April 5, 1979, p. 3.
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supply than price. In the language of economists, energy was 
considered an inelastic commodity--something for which the demand is 
not tied tightly to price. As, however, the price of OPEC oil rose 
from an average $12.70 a barrel in 1978 to more than $30 a barrel in 
1 9 8 0 , 1 this view changed. After years of believing the demand for 
oil perpetually would rise, energy companies began predicting steady 
declines. The Oil and Gas Journal summarized what key oil companies 
were forecasting in 1 9 8 1 : 2
1. The role oil and gas play in the total energy supply in 
the United States would decrease from the 1980 level o f  70 percent
to 30 percent by the y e a r  2000. In November 1981 oil and gas supplied 
about 50 percent of the total energy used in the United States.
2. The United States would consume an average 15 million 
barrels of oil a day in 1990 compared with 17 million barrels in 1980.
By the y e a r  2000 fewer than 13 million barrels of oil would be 
consumed daily in the United States.
At about the same time world oil prices were climbing, 
additional supply systems into some Northern Tier states were being 
developed. According to David Kern, a manager in Conoco's crude oil 
supply and trading department, "Since serious discussions began in late 
1975 concerning a major pipeline alternate, the so-called Northern Tier 
supply systems have spawned man y  alternative supply a c t i v i t i e s . 1,3
lOil and Gas Journal, Sept. 21, 1981.
2Ibid.
3David Kem, unpublished prefiled statement presented at the 
Department of Energy inquiry on its report Petroleum Supply Alternatives 
for the Northern Tier and Inland States Through the Year 2000: Draft
Report, Billings, Mont., April 5, 1979, p. 4.
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Those alternatives, Kem said, chiefly were the expansion of Gulf Coast 
originating pipelines and exchanges of oil with Canada.
The primary expansion activity was the construction o f  a 
pipeline from Illinois to Minnesota. The Northern Pipeline, a joint 
venture by the William's Pipeline Company and Koch Industries, Inc. 
connected refineries in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area with the 
Midcontinent pipeline system. The pipeline opened in early 1981 and 
its daily delivery of up to 130,000 barrels of o i l 1 ended most 
speculation that Minnesota would have an oil shortage.
Montana's primary supply option was a system of exchanges of  
crude oil with C a n a d a — United States crude oil was shipped to 
eastern Canada in return for Alberta oil pumped into the Northern 
Tier region. The Department of Energy described the exchanges:
A typical exchange transaction might involve a refinery in 
Minnesota that orders 5,000 barrels of west Texas crude sent 
through Midcontinent pipelines to Illinois. Because of 
transportation deficiencies from Illinois.to Minnesota, the oil 
is shipped East by prior agreement in a Canadian pipeline to a 
refiner in Montreal. Simultaneously, the Montreal refiner 
arranges for the shipment of an equal volume of Alberta crude 
through the underutilized Interprovincial pipeline, which becomes 
the Lakehead pipeline in Minnesota. All such exchanges are made 
on a barrel-for-barrel basis.2
By 1979 exchanges of crude oil accounted for 100,000 barrels a day 
to the Northern Tier region (see Table 4, p. 23).
lOil and Gas Journal, Sept. 1, 1981.
2U.S., Department of Energy, Petroleum Supply Alternatives, 
op. cit., p. 53.
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TABLE 4
VOLUMES.OF UNITED STATES/CANADIAN EXCHANGES
Year Month Barrels per day
1977 (Average) 55,059
1978 January 74,779
February 80,838
March 83,737
April 64,849
May 78,926
June 96,566
July 87,088
August 108,665
September 95,000
October 104,392
November 110,240
S o u r c e :
U.S., Department of Energy, Petroleum Supply Alternatives 
for the Northern Tier and Inland States Through the Year 2000: Draft
Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 42.
The Department of Interior said,
As long as there is sufficient pipeline capacity to continue 
"swaps," this alternative appears to be the most efficient of the 
alternatives to supply light crude oil to the Northern Tier 
refineries.1
1U.S., Department of Interior, West to East Crude Oil, op. 
cit., p. 25.
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In his draft report, Cardullo cited three advantages of the 
exchanges:
1. Major new pipeline construction would not be necessary.
2. Environmental risks associated with a major new oil port 
on the Pacific Coast could be avoided.
3. Future United States/Canadian cooperation in energy 
matters would be encouraged.
To sum this montage of opinion and statistics, the pipeline 
company and its consultants maintained there would be at least a
700,000 barrel a day shortage of crude oil without the pipeline.
This was predicated on an increasing demand for crude oil and the use 
of some non-Northern Tier states in the estimates. While the Department 
of Energy also said there would be an oil shortage, its 200,000 barrel 
a day estimate was considerably smaller. The Department of Interior, 
Washington state and several ma j o r  energy companies said that crude 
oil demand would not increase. Without an increase in demand there 
would be no oil shortage in the Midwest because existing refineries 
have supply systems from the Gulf Coast.
Looking at all this in the clear light of 1983, we can see 
that the Department of Interior gave the most accurate projections. 
Demand'for crude oil has dropped dramatically and many American 
refineries have shut down or slowed production because of it. There 
is no deficit in supply, just a considerable drop in demand.
CHAPTER I I I
COVERAGE OF THE ISSUE 
Eminent Domain
There were some gaps and a few mistakes in the Missoulian’s 
coverage of the eminent domain issue. For example, the paper didn't 
report that the pipeline company had acquired the power of eminent 
domain until nine months after it had been r e c e i v e d . 1 The legal 
challenges against the law that gave the company eminent domain were 
not covered well, n e i ther did the Missoulian explain wh a t  the company 
would do with its condemnation power.
The nine-month delay in announcing that Northern Tier could 
condemn private property probably was excusable. The eminent domain 
law was 60 years old and rarely used. The law does not call for legal 
proceedings o r  hearings that could have generated news stories and 
most persons, including the Public Service Commission's lawyer, had 
not heard of i t . 2
The law--Title 69, Chapter 13, Section 101 of the Montana Codes 
Annotated--automatically grants common carrier p i p e l i n e s 3 the power of
Northern Tier received the power of eminent domain in July 
1978. The Missoulian reported it in April 1979.
2Public Service Commission lawyer, Eileen Shore, said in a 
personal interview that she did not know the law existed until she 
received a letter from the pipeline company.
3A common carrier oil pipeline carries oil for anyone who 
contracts with it.
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eminent domain after a company agrees to be regulated by the Public 
Service Commission. Northern Tier quietly did this on July 27, 1978 
in a letter to the Public Service Commission.
The Missoulian's first reference to the law was in an article 
about a March 8, 1979 public hearing in Missoula, The article quoted 
an unidentified person who said,
Since the pipeline would be a "common carrier" for different 
oil companies, the Northern Tier Pipeline Company will be able to 
use power of eminent domain to condemn private land for pipeline 
right-of-way.1
Sen. John Melcher disputed this, saying the Montana Attorney 
General's Office had told him that Northern Tier could not condemn 
private property in the state. Melcher said witnesses who testified 
at the public hearing "should be asked to cite references" to support 
their c l a i m s . 2
Jan Rappe, a persistent pipeline critic, did this in a letter 
printed in the Missoulian April 3.
Northern Tier Pipeline [Company's] proposed project qualifies 
as a common carrier pipeline under the definitions found in Title 
69, Chapter 13, Section 101. . . .  On July 27, 1978, T. C. Kryzer, 
president of Northern Tier Pipeline [Company] submitted a letter 
to the chairman of the Montana Public Service Commission [saying 
his company agreed to be regulated by the commission]. Upon 
acceptance, [Northern Tier Pipeline Company] would be granted 
. . . "rights and powers of eminent domain."3
Twice during the next week, Melcher admitted he was w r o n g — in 
an interview and in a letter to the Missoulian:
lMissoulian, March 9, 1979, p. 1.
2Ibid., March 14, 1979, p. 1.
3Ibid., April 3, 1979, p. 4.
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Jan Rappe is correct that Montana law permits oil pipelines 
the right of eminent domain. . . .  I regret any confusion I may 
have caused Montana landowners who are subjected to this 
provision.1
But confusion over eminent domain wasn't eliminated easily.
In his letter, Melcher said Rappe's contention that federal law 
allows oil pipelines eminent domain was incorrect: "Federal law does
not provide condemnation authority for an oil p i p e l i n e . " 2 Melcher 
must have been referring to a confusing statement made by Rappe: 
"Applicable federal laws can be f o u n d . " 3
An April 11, 1979 story headlined "UM Professor Challenges 
Melcher's Pipeline Remarks" said the Secretary of Interior can grant 
rights-of-way for petroleum pipelines on federal la n d . 1* The information 
came from University of Montana professor Robert Curry who had called 
the Attorney General's office in Washington, D.C. Melcher didn't 
respond to the letter and no mention was made again in the paper about 
federal eminent domain.
It wasn't until the middle of April that the Missoulian 
reported that Northern Tier had eminent domain. The article said the 
company had received it "last y e a r . " 5 It also paraphrased Public 
Service Commission attorney Eileen Shore:
1Ibid., April 10, 1979, p. 2.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., April 3, 1978, p. 4.
**Ibid., April 11, 1979, p. 14.
sIbid., April 14, 1979, p. 3.
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Usually there are negotiations between the landowner and the 
company to determine a fair price for the easement, Shore said.
She added that companies like to avoid litigation because of the 
time and expense involved and because juries tend.to give healthy 
awards to the private landowner.1
The article also referred to a Northern Tier attorney who 
called his company's plan of procedure in condemnation complicated.
He said the company had a variety of options that could be used 
depending on the case. The Missoulian didn't, however, say what the 
complicated plan involved or what options the company had.
The news about the company's condemnation power seemed to harden 
pipeline opposition. The issue spurred letters to the paper and 
testimony at public hearings. The targets: Melcher and the pipeline
company. Between April 11, 1979 and March 14, 1980, 14 letters in 
the Missoulian referred to the company's ability to force easements 
on private land.
According to the Missoulian, Melcher was grilled at a public 
hearing in Frenchtowri, a hotbed of antipipeline activity. One 
resident said that Melcher was "naive beyond belief" if he thought 
the pipeline company would treat landowners fairly; "in past 
condemnation proceedings, the landowner has consistently been 
c h e a t e d . " 2 The final comment in the article came from a Six Mile 
area resident who asked Melcher if D. Michael Curran, a partner in 
Northern Tier, had contributed money to the senator's campaign.
Melcher said he thought so.
1Ibid.
2Ibid., April 19, 1979, p. 1.
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The same day that Melcher was questioned, the Department of 
Energy held a public hearing in Missoula on a draft report it had 
prepared on the future petroleum supply in the Northern Tier:
Testimony ended on a grim note when Larry Dodge, a University 
of Montana faculty affiliate, told those at the hearing that "at 
least 84" persons had told him they would "shoot before they allow 
a pipeline to cross their land."
"Montana would be only too ripe for a civil war over its 
natural resources," he concluded.1
The April 20 Missoulian contained an article, an editorial 
and a letter concerning Melcher and eminent domain. The article was 
about the senator's efforts to change the pipeline's route so it would 
cross less private land. Melcher said he had asked the U.S.D.A.
Forest Service and Northern Tier to look at a possible route to take 
the line away from the Six and Nine Mile areas and put it onto 
national Forest Service land. He did this "because of objections to 
the pipeline he heard Wednesday night [April 11, 1979] from landowners 
in the Six Mile and Nine Mile a r e a s . " 2 With the exception o f  some 
letters, the paper ran nothing more for six months about eminent 
domain. There was no follow-up story about the company's or the 
Forest Service's reaction to Melcher's suggestion to change the 
route.
In September the Northern Tier Information C o m m i t t e e 3 filed 
a petition with the Public Service Commission challenging the 
constitutionality of the eminent domain law. According to the
1Ibid., p. 13.
ZIbid., April 20, 1979, p. 1.
3The committee, founded in the winter of 1979, was a western 
Montana citizen's group that actively opposed the pipeline.
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Missoulian, the petition asked the Public Service Commission to 
determine w h e t h e r  or not it had to consider environmental impacts 
before granting the p o w e r . 1 The basis for the challenge was that the 
state's constitution and the Montana Environmental Policy Act require 
completion o f  an Environmental Impact Statement preceding major state 
actions. The committee maintained that granting eminent domain was a 
major state action and, therefore, it required an environmental 
assessment.
A second article about the petition was printed that month.
The three-inch story said the Public Service Commission was soliciting 
comments about the law because its constitutionality was being 
challenged and that public comments must be made by October 29, 1979.2 
The Public Service Commission moved the final comment deadline to 
November 13, at the request of Northern T i e r , 3 and the paper reported 
it. On October 31, Sam Reynolds, editorial page editor, wrote,
Write a letter, grab someone's private property. That's 
Montana's eminent domain law for pipelines. It seems eminently 
unfair.
But it can be done when a pipeline company writes a letter 
to the Montana Public Service Commission. The company states it 
will abide by the provisions of Montana's pipeline carriers' 
statute and— bang!— it has the power to buy property from private 
citizens who are unwilling to sell. *
1Ibid., Sept. 19, 1979, p. 1.
2Ibid., Sept. 29 1979, p. 2.
3Ibid., Oct. 31, 1979, p. 8.
**Ibid. , p. 4.
With the exception of the mistake about buying land— the company would 
buy the easement from the landowner, not the land i t s e l f — the 
editorial explained the law and the petition well. Reynolds urged 
readers to write to the Public Service Commission about the petition.
In December, District Judge Peter Meloy ordered the Public 
Service Commission to stop its actions concerning the petition. Meloy 
said the commission didn't have authority to perform the r e v iew.1 
The Missoulian reported this and said a court hearing on the ruling 
would be held December 19.
The article didn't say why Meloy was ruling on the Public 
Service Commission action or what the court case would address. That 
information appeared five weeks later when the Missoulian reported the 
hearing would be postponed until February 11, 1 9 8 0 . 2 It explained 
that Meloy's action was a restraining order initiated by Northern Tier 
and that the District Court hearing would decide the "extent of the 
Public Service Commission's authority to r e g u l a t e " 3 Northern Tier.
That was the last article about the court case. The Missoulian 
failed to tell its readers the outcome of the hearing in w h i c h  Meloy 
ruled mostly in favor of Northern Tier, saying that because the 
pipeline company was working with the state to assess the environmental 
risks of the project, issuing eminent domain did not violate state la w . 1*
'ibid., Dec. 4, 1979, p. 1.
2Ibid., Jan. 12, 1979, p. 8.
3 Ibid.
"‘Personal interview with Jan Rappe, pipeline critic, May, 1983.
In March 1980 the paper reported a suit filed by the Northern 
Tier Information Committee against the pipeline company to strike 
down the eminent domain statute. The suit claimed that the law 
violated the state constitution and the Montana Environmental Policy 
A c t . 1 This article was the paper's only mention of the suit. The 
eminent domain law battle was not covered for one year.
On February 22, 1981 the Missoulian said a bill had been 
introduced in the legislature to limit the state's authority to grant 
eminent domain. The bill would require that all state permits be 
issued and that the public Service Commission determine a project 
was in the public interest before eminent domain could be granted.
The Missoulian reported that
The bill would require that a company wanting to use eminent 
domain powers for a project would first have to obtain any 
required state permits for that project. . . .  In addition, for 
some projects, the Public Service Commission would have to 
determine that granting of the power of eminent domain would 
serve the "public convenience and necessity."2
On February 25 the Missoulian reported the defeat of the 
bill by the House o f  Representatives 55 to 4 2 . 3 That was the end of 
the battle against the pipeline company's eminent domain power and, 
with the exception of two letters, the end of the paper's coverage 
of the issue.
1Missoulian, March 8, 1980, p. 1.
2Ibid., Feb. 22, 1981, p. 9.
3Ibid., Feb. 25, 1981, p. 16.
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Melcher's Second Hurry-up Bill
Sen. Melcher and other politicians were concerned that 
permitting procedures were hampering Northern Tier's chances of being 
built. In 1977 Melcher introduced Title V of the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Act. Apparently dissatisfied with the Department of 
I n t e r i o r ’s progress on Northern Tier's application, the senator 
introduced another bill to speed federal handling o f  Northern Tier's 
permit. It would (1) require the Secretary o f  Interior--not the 
President as Title V mandated--to decide which pipeline would 
receive the special federal handling, (2) move the deadline for 
completion of the final environmental impact statement from August 
to July and (3) limit judicial review by making any court challenge 
to the Department of Interior's decision illegal and setting a 
60-day limit on court challenges based on the constitutionality 
of the b i l l .
The Missoulian covered the bill well at first. It was 
explained, commented on editorially and, with the help of a full-page 
letter to the editor, it put Melcher's involvement with the bill into 
an enlightening historical perspective. The paper failed, however, 
to keep track o f  the bill's progress.
The first mention of the speed-up bill was in Don 
Schwennesen's April 1, 1979 column. He wrote that Melcher wanted 
the review process hurried because the three other pipeline proposals 
were inferior and there was no need to take the time to prepare 
detailed impact statements on them. The column also said the pipeline
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review process already was being expedited and that the new legislation 
might limit legal challenges against the p i p e l i n e . 1
Between April 1 and the middle of the month, the Missoulian 
carried three stories that referred to governmental delays in 
processing the pipeline permits. One concerned Montana Rep. Ron 
Marlenee's desire to push the review process a l o n g . 2 Another mentioned 
Mel cher's concern about the lack of p r o g r e s s , 3 and the third contained 
complaints by the pipeline company's president about government red 
tape slowing federal a p p r o v a l .14
On April 13 the Missoulian ran an Associated Press story 
about Melcher's introduction o f  the bi l l . 5 Only a quarter of the 
article related to the bill and that portion contained superficial 
information. Most of the story was devoted to wha t  officials of the 
Northern Tie r  and the PACAT P i p e l i n e 6 had to say about their projects.
An article the following day said the senator would meet 
again with Frenchtown residents. It also said the bill would prohibit 
court challenges against the administration's decision, which now 
would be made by the Secretary o f  Interior instead o f  President Carter.
lIbid., April 1, 1979, p. 11.
2Ibid., April 5, 1979, P. 13.
3Ibid., April 7, 1979, p. 4.
kIbid., April 9, 1979, p. 2.
5Ibid., April 13, 1979, p. 2.
6The PACAT line was a proposal to build a 270-mile pipeline 
across Guatemala. It would be used by crude oil tankers that otherwise 
would travel through the Panama Canal.
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An attempt to explain w hy special legislation was not needed 
was made by Jan Rappe in an April 17 letter:
Sen. Melcher is upset by what he has termed Department of 
Interior "foot-dragging." It must be understood that the proposed 
Northern Tier pipeline v?ill be the largest crude oil transportation 
system of its kind in the lower 48 states. . . .
The National Environmental Policy Act was set up by Congress 
to ensure that a system of checks and balances existed to protect 
the general welfare of all citizens, especially in projects of 
this size. Federal law requires that an environmental statement 
be issued to study the impacts. The Bureau of Land Management was 
the agency responsible for preparing the statement.
The draft was made public in January and we found it to be 
completely inadequate. The final [Bureau of Land Management] 
impact statement will include the [Bureau of Land Management's] 
own research, the findings of the Department of Energy as well as 
citizen input. . . . The Environmental Policy Act contains 
appropriate safeguards to ensure that the best interests of the 
country are achieved while protecting the rights of the individual. 
This process should not be rushed. The Department of Interior 
isn't dragging its feet but just complying with the law.1
Hearings on S. 968 were to be held by mid-May. Schwennesen 
reported this in his column which also gave some background for the 
bill, discussed Melcher's involvement with similar legislation passed 
for the trans-Alaskan pipeline and added some new information:
Melcher also was a sponsor of the 1973 legislation that 
authorized the building of the Alaska pipeline and that headed 
off court appeals.
Congress approved that measure by a wide margin, even though, 
critics at the time argued that the pipeline would cause a West 
Coast oil surplus and was designed to allow export of Alaska oil 
to Japan.
To allay those fears, Melcher also supported a provision in 
the Alaska pipeline measure that prevents export of Alaska crude 
oil.
S. 968 actually amends a similar measure sponsored by Melcher 
last year. That measure was intended to speed up a pipeline 
decision, but,.according to Melcher, it was changed by the House 
and ended up as Title V of the Public Utility Regulatory Act of 
1978.
lIbid., May 17,.1979, p. 4.
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In the end, it probably further delayed a decision by setting 
up a new federal permit procedure under which four pipeline 
consortiums (instead of just Northern Tier) have applied for 
permits.1
The new information was that the 60-day limit and the bill's number was
S. 968.
Reynolds printed a harsh editorial against the bill on May 
14, the day it was scheduled to be heard in committee. Reynolds 
called the bill "pernicious in all its p a r t s . " 2 The only new 
information in the editorial was that S. 968 would remove a 60-day 
extension option during which the President would have had to make 
his decision.
Reynolds quoted from the bill and ended by criticizing the
senator:
Melcher's bill says that " . . .  the actions of the federal 
officers concerning the issuance of the necessary rights-of-way, 
permits, leases and other authorizations for construction and 
initial operation at full capacity of said pipeline system shall 
not be subject to judicial review under any law. . . . "
Melcher's bill would even prohibit a judge, from issuing an 
injunction to stop the administration from going ahead with 
construction and operation of a pipeline. No injunctive relief 
would be allowed.
A protesting Montanan could do nothing to stop the project, 
however damaging it might be to his.livelihood and property.
Thus would Sen. John Melcher protect the interest of his 
constitutents.
This bill, S. 968, should be shot into oblivion— all of it—  
leaving not a single pestilential feather to float down and 
contaminate the statute books.3
Much of the text of the judicial review section of S. 968 
appeared in a 5,300-word June 1 letter to the editor. The letter,
1Ibid., p. 17.
zIbid., May .14, 1979, p. 4.
3Jbid.
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written by Mavis McKelvey, told about M e l c h e r 1s efforts to speed the 
authorization of the trans-Alaska pipeline in November 1973. Quoting 
a June 1973 Missoulian column, the letter said:
In Melcher's bill, HR. 9130 (Melcher was a member of the House 
then), it is directed that the trans-Alaska pipeline shall be 
built immediately and any possibility of further appeals in the 
courts based on the-National Environmental Policy Act is 
specifically forbidden in the bill.
In other words, Melcher has said the trans-Alaska pipeline 
shall be built, but any citizen's concern about the environment, 
legitimate or otherwise, may not be brought before the courts 
under NEPA, even though recourse to the courts often is the last 
resort the citizenry has, and is a right supposedly guaranteed 
under the constitution.1
The letter said the bill basically was a "rewrite of the 
trans-Alaska Pipeline A c t . " 2 Printed one and one-half months before 
the deadline that S. 968 would set for the release of the final impact 
statement, the letter also said,
So far only a draft [Environmental Impact Statement] has been 
completed on one of the proposals, the Northern Tier pipeline, 
and it is already out of date. Because of the hundreds of changes 
made by the [Northern Tier Pipeline Company], and the thousands of 
challenges to the adequacy of the [Bureau of Land Management's] 
information, the final [Environmental Impact Statement] will be a 
substantially different document.
So far nothing has been released on the other pipeline 
proposals that route through Canada. In spite of this, the bill 
says that the secretary of interior shall issue his decision 
approving one of the route proposals within 45 days from the 
completion date.3
This was another issue the paper did not keep track of. It never told 
its readers what happened at that hearing or that the bill failed to 
make it out o f  committee. The Missoulian never referred to S. 968 
again.
1Ibid., June 1, 1979, p. 5.
2Ibid.
3Jjbid.
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The Environmental Impact Statement process was mentioned in 
Schwennesen's June 7 column. He said the final Environmental Impact 
Statement should be released in the fall but said nothing about S. 968.
To refresh your memory, here's what's going on. Northern Tier 
originally applied for a pipeline permit to cross federal lands, 
under terms of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which provides 
for such things.
Then spurred by Sen. John Melcher, Congress passed a new law 
last year that set up a special new procedure to speed up the 
pipeline permit process.
By that time, Interior had almost finished the draft impact 
statement on Northern Tier's original application. But three 
other companies quickly scurried to apply for pipeline permits 
under terms of the new law. Northern Tier was forced to do the 
same.
That left Interior sitting with a draft impact statement on 
one pipeline under one law— but with, new directions from Congress 
to review four pipeline applications under a new law. . . . 1
The impact statement was mentioned again on August 6 when the paper
said the final Environmental Impact Statement would be published in
the fall--several months after the deadline set by S. 968. Thus, as
with the three eminent domain challenges, the Missoulian failed to
keep track of the legal actions.
Montana's Legislative Control
The state's inability to control the pipeline was not limited 
to eminent domain. A loophole in Montana's Major Facility Siting Act 
exempts pipelines from that law's jurisdiction. Unlike the eminent 
domain law, which caught mos t  people by surprise, the problem in the 
siting act was known to many, particularly pipeline opponents. It 
didn't, however, receive much attention in the Missoulian until the 
state's final impact statement was released.
lIbid., June 7, 1979, p. 8.
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In the early spring of 1979 the Missoulian printed a story 
about a speech in Great Falls by Peter Funk of the Montana 
Environmental Information Center. Funk said the pipeline company 
would have a free hand during construction because the line didn't 
qualify for review under the siting act, so the state had little 
oversight autho r i z a t i o n . 1
An article about how President Carter's energy plan might 
influence the pipeline also quoted Funk. The article was the second 
of a three-part series on Montana's energy development in relation 
to Carter's energy policies. Because Carter was expected to endorse 
Northern Tier, the reporter wrote, "That leaves the decision-making 
up to the states the pipeline will pass t h r o u g h . " 2 In the article,
Funk disputed this:
Under Montana law, Funk said, the pipeline does not qualify 
as a major facility and thus is not governed by the Major 
Facilities Siting Act. . . .  If the pipeline did come under siting 
act regulation, state officials would have one life-or-death say 
over the pipeline's construction in Montana.3
The article said Montana's control was piecemeal and limited 
to about 30 minor permits regulating such things as stream and road 
crossings, none of which could be used to influence the line 
significantly. Funk said that "if any of these relatively minor 
permits is not granted, the pipeline company will be able to revise 
its plans in order to comply with the terms of the p e r m i t . " 1*
1Ibid., May 13, 1979, p. 8.
2Ibid., Aug. 6, 1979, p. 11.
3Ibid.
l*Ibid.
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In "Northern Tier Power Supplies Not G u a r a n t e e d , " 1 Dave Jam's, 
coordinator of Montana's Environmental Impact Statement effort, was 
questioned about the possible lack of adequate power for the pipeline. 
Janis said he didn't know if there was a problem in energy supplies to 
run the pumping stations because his agency didn't address the question 
in its analysis. "The state's only concern in this m atter is issuing 
permits to the project for highways, streams, and state land 
c ro s s i n g s , " 2 he said. Janis also said that if the pipeline wasn't 
exempt from the siting act, the power supply would have been studied 
by the state.
Apparently there still was confusion about the state's role. 
Schwennesen's August 26 column implied that the state had the power 
to block the pipeline. After saying President Carter's decision on 
the pipeline was due October 15, weeks before Montana would issue 
its final Environmental Impact Statement, Schwennesen asked, "What 
happenes if the feds say yes to Northern Tier and the state says n o ? " 3
About five months after that column appeared, the state's 
final impact statement was released. The Missoulian printed two 
stories about the release of the impact statement and that the report 
said the state had no authority over pipeline construction. A front 
page story said,
The state of Montana issued its final Environmental Impact 
Statement for the proposed Northern Tier pipeline Wednesday, 
concluding that the state is virtually powerless to stop the 
project. . ... Montana law gives insufficient authority to state
1Ibid., Aug. 18, 1979, p. 1.
2Ibid.
3Ibid. , A p r i l  2 4 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p. 2.
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and local agencies to prohibit the construction of pipeline projects 
such as the Northern Tier pipeline.1
The second article, on page 2, said pipeline opponents had known the 
state could do little. In it, Rappe briefly explained the siting act 
e x e m p t i o n . 2
Reynolds wrote an editorial about the exemption: "What can
the state do? The [Environmental Impact Statement] gives the answer: 
Nothing. Not one thing can Montana do to stop or even effectively 
control the pipeline's c o n s t r u c t i o n . 1,3 Reynolds urged the legislature 
to correct the flaw at its next session. The legislature did not 
amend the siting act.
Coverage of the Need Question
The tangled topic of the pipeline's need was the central 
question and salient concern of the Northern Tier issue. Certainly 
environmental, social and economic impacts were important to 
Montanans, but need was the primary issue.
Coverage o f  the need question is divided into two segments:
The deficit and the surplus. The deficit section is further divided 
into the paper's coverage of the three ma j o r  federal s t u d i e s , 1* which 
provided much of the independent analytical information, and its
1Ibid.l April 24, 1980, p. 1.
2Ibid., p. 2.
3Ibid., April 29, 1980, p. 4.
4The principal studies are Cardullo1s Department of Energy 
draft, Petroleum Supply Alternatives, op. cit.; McGregor's Department 
of Energy Analysis of West-to-East Pipeline Applications, op. cit.; 
and the Department of Interior’s Report to the President, op. cit.
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coverage of the myriad events and side issues related to the question. 
These events included changes in the Canadian cutoff timetable, 
Midcontinent supply systems, permitting procedures that address the 
need question and reports about changes in energy-use patterns. This 
part of the thesis describes and sorts the bird's nest of information
the paper provided about the necessity of building the Northern Tier
pipeline.
The Deficit
Major federal s t u d i e s . Nowhere was the existence of 
conflicting information about the pipeline more apparent than in the 
federal government's attempts to study the need for a new 
transportation system. The findings that implied a pipeline wasn't 
needed were adamantly contested by Northern Tier backers, and the 
studies contradicted each other. These polemics affected the news 
coverage because the disputes, not the contents o f  the reports, 
dominated the Missoulian's treatment of the studies.
In February 1979 the Department of Energy released the draft 
version of its principal study of the Northern Tier oil supply 
situation. The Missoulian ran four stories: two discussed the
report's findings and two were about reactions to the report. The 
first story was about a leak to the Seattle Times by an unnamed 
Department o f  Energy official. Information about the report was a 
secondary lead. The article said another pipeline company was
proposing an oil port on the Washington coast:
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A second major oil pipeline firm— Trans Mountain Pipeline 
[Company]— wants to build a tanker port on Washington's Olympic 
Peninsula, a Seattle newspaper reported Tuesday.
And in a related development, the other firm seeking to 
build such a port, Northern Tier Pipeline [Company], was dealt 
a blow Tuesday by the federal Department of Energy, which leaked 
preliminary results of a study concluding, among other things, 
that the need for Northern Tier's pipeline may have been 
overstated. . . .
The report leaked Tuesday by Department of Energy could pose 
a serious problem for the Northern Tier [Company].
As proposed, the pipeline would have the capacity to carry 
more than twice as much oil as needed to northern and Midwest 
states by the year 2000, the study says.
"What we saw in the study is that the demand for additional 
pipeline capacity may be overstated," said a federal official 
familiar with the report, which is to be released Wednesday.1
The Missoulian printed a second story about the report two 
days later. In "Melcher Blasts Report on Need for Oil Pipeline," 
the senator called the study "pathetic," the work of "amateurs," and 
he urged the Secretary of Energy to reject it and start o v e r . 2 The 
story also said the draft was being withheld, but that Sens. Henry 
Jackson and Warren Magnuson, Washington state Democrats, were trying 
to get it released.
The article quoted Jim Hodge, a Northern Tier vice president: 
"We do feel that the study when released will be favorable toward 
Northern T i e r . " 3 But the study wasn't favorable. On February 24 
another story about the study said a new pipeline could usefully 
carry about 300,000 to 350,000 barrels a day of Alaskan oil to 
Northern Tier states: "For economic reasons, the refineries would
1Missoulian, Feb. 21, 1979, p. 1.
2Ibid., Feb. 24, 1979, p. 2.
3Xbid.
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probably prefer to continue receiving a mix of "sweet" [low sulfur] 
and "sour" [high sulfur] oil than make the necessary conversions 
to process more high-sulfur c r u d e s , " 1 which Alaska supplies. The 
story did not say what deficit projections the report made. Neither 
did it directly mention the West Coast glut. It did say that 
Melcher had termed the study "pathetic" and "not factual" after he 
had read its summary.2
The fourth article, February 27, concerned the pipeline 
company's responses to the Department of Energy's draft report.
Hodge maintained that the report underestimated the future shortage by 
about 150,000 barrels a d a y . 3 The article also quoted Steve McGregor, 
director o f  the Office of Oil and Gas policy at the Department of  
Energy, who said the report didn't consider non-Northern Tier.states. 
McGregor said the Northern Tier pipeline, via existing pipelines that 
could be fed from it, could expand its market area to much o f  the 
Midwest, making it profitable.
Although the Department o f  Energy report was one of the key 
studies determining need and was supposed to be a cornerstone for the 
federal decision on which the pipeline would be endorsed, the Missoulian 
ran no story of its own about wha t  the study said. Neither did the 
paper explain why Melcher attacked the study so vehemently or what 
the market area would be (Northern Tier's chief point of contention 
with the study).
1Ibid. , Feb. 24, 1979, p. 2.
2Ibid.
*Ibid., Feb. 27, 1979, p. 1.
In two stories about Department of Energy hearings, the 
paper printed some basic findings of and rebuttals to the study.
An Associated Press story in April about a Department of Energy 
hearing in Seattle was the Missoulian*s first mention of the report 
deficit projection: "The [Department of Energy] report says the
maximum need will be 400,000 barrels of oil a day":in the Northern 
Tier r e g i o n . 1 The story also said that Northern Tier disputed 
the Department of Energy's figures. Keith Kovacs, a consultant for 
Northern Tier, said the Department of Energy's deficit estimate 
was far understated because the analysis did not consider the 12 
Midwest states the pipeline could serve. At a similar hearing in 
Missoula, Hodge said the Department of Energy's deficit projection 
was about 600,000 barrels a day too small. Hodge also said his 
company could find markets in nondeficit areas because it could 
"compete economically with existing sys t e m s . " 2
A curious twist occurred in July 1979. A final Department 
of Energy report was released on the Northern Tier supply situation 
but Cardullo wasn't the author. McGregor was, and the study used 
some assumptions different from those in the draft. Cardullo then 
completed his final report, but it was not used by the Department 
of Energy and he was ordered not to discuss his findings.
The Missoulian reported the Department of Energy rift in 
October in an Associated Press story based on a report in the 
Seattle Times:
1Ibid., April 5, 1979, p. 3.
2James R. Hodge, unpublished prefiled testimony, op. cit.
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Federal officials apparently disagree on the merits of a 
study on various pipeline alternatives to pump oil from the 
West Coast to the Midwest.
The Seattle Times reported Thursday that Steve McGregor, 
director of the federal oil-and-gas policy office, is at odds 
with Mario Cardullo, head of the federal energy transportation 
section of the Department of Energy, over a study by Cardullo.
The Times reported that the disagreement began in February 
when Cardullo's office prepared a draft report that was 
unfavorable to the pipeline route proposed by the Northern Tier 
Pipeline [Company] from Port Angeles to Clearbrook, Minn.
Cardullo's draft study said Northern Tier's pipeline was 
designed with more than twice the capacity needed to meet 
projected Midwest oil refinery deficits in the year 2000.
After the draft was made public, the [Department of Energy] 
quietly decided not to use the yet-to-be released final version 
as its official position on the various pipeline proposals.
On July 11, the [Department of Energy] released a study 
prepared by McGregor's office which put Northern Tier in much 
more favorable light.1
With the exception o f  the statement that McGregor's report 
put Northern Tier "in much more favorable light," the article did not 
mention McGregor's findings. Later, the Missoulian did run a story 
about McGregor's results although the information was brief and 
g e n e r a l :
The proposed Northern Tier oil pipeline . . . could provide 
the greatest economic benefit of four proposed west-to-east oil 
pipelines. . . .
The most important variable affecting net national economic 
benefit is savings in tanker movements from Valdez, Alaska, to 
the U.S. Gulf Coat," the study said.
If there is a substantial surplus of Alaska North Slope 
crude, these savings are largest for Northern Tier and this 
proposal yields the greatest net economic benefit.2
McGregor's report estimated that Northern Tier states could be short
1Missoulian, Oct. 6, 1979, p. 1.
2Ibid., Aug. 16, i860, p. 2.
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up to 900,000 barrels a day by the y e a r  2000. That differed widely 
from a Department o f  Interior report also released in July 19 7 9 . 1
The Department of Interior concluded that by the y e a r  2000 
Northern Tier states would have a net surplus of 540,000 barrels a 
day without any of the proposed pipelines. The report was not 
released until later that fall. The Seattle Times received an advance 
copy and the Missoulian picked up the story. The article made six 
s t a t e m e n t s :2
1. In all likelihood, none of the four proposed lines would 
be needed.
2. Montana and Minnesota "will have a gap between crude oil 
supply and demand" of 165,000 barrels a day.
3. Michigan, Illinois, Indiana and Ohio probably will have 
a surplus exceeding 600,000 barrels a day by the y e a r  2000.
4. The surplus of Alaskan oil on the West Coast may not 
remain much longer.
5. The proposed pipelines might not choose to process oil 
supplied by any of the lines as other crude oil sources become 
available.
6. "The problem with supply in the area [Northern Tier 
states] is considered minimal."
A response to the report by Montana Rep. Ron Marlenee, a 
strong supporter of Northern Tier, was printed two days later. The
xTh^ U.S., Department of Interior report was entitled West 
to East Crude Oil, op. cit.
2Missoulian, A u g .  2 3 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1.
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article said Marlenee believed the report contained favorable 
recommendations from the Departments of Justice, Defense, Transportation 
and S t a t e . 1
Contents of the Department of Interior study also were printed 
on August 29. The article repeated much of the information given 
previously and added that Montana's daily share of the deficit would 
be 40,000 barrels by 1985 and 60,000 barrels by the y e a r  2000. 
Minnesota's daily crude oil shortage would be 90,000 barrels in 1984 
and about 50,000 barrels in the y e a r  2000. The story also said North 
Dakota would have a 50,000 barrel a day deficit in the y e a r  200 0 2 and 
that Oregon, Washington and Idaho would have a combined 5,000 barrel 
a day shortage.
Referring to the West Coast surplus, the article said the 
Department of Interior believed the glut would evaporate as Prudhoe 
Bay production began to decline in 1985. If the surplus was to be 
maintained, the article quoted the report, then "a large oil field with 
daily production rates similar to those of Prudhoe Bay will have to be 
found and developed before 1985. It is not at all clear from where 
such vast reserves will c o m e . " 3 This was one of the few Missoulian 
articles that mentioned alternative supply sources: "The best way
1Ibid., Aug. 25, 1979, p. 16.
. 2This figure probably is a printing error and should have 
said 5,000; U.S., Department of Interior, West to East Crude Oil, 
op. cit.
zMissoulian, A u g .  2 9 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1.
to handle the shortages inland might be to swap oil with Canada, 
increase production locally or buy Mexican oil and ship it north 
through existing p i p e l i n e s . 1
Northern Tier's reaction to the Department of Interior's 
findings followed three days later. Jim Hodge, interviewed by a 
Missoulian reporter, said the Department of Interior had failed to 
consider the entire market area, including Midwest states: "By no
means is it a market s t u d y . " 2 Hodge also said the study was just a 
draft report and predicted the final report would be much different.
This was the bulk of the coverage the three studies received. 
Cardullo's final report was issued October 17, but no story about 
it appeared. One indication o f  its contents appeard in the October 
6 story about the Cardullo versus McGregor reports:
Sources familiar with the final version . . . .  [said] it 
may predict an oil supply deficit for West Coast refineries in 
the latter part of the century, in contrast to a West Coast oil 
glut that exists now.3
Events and side i s s u e s . In addition to its coverage of the 
reports, the Missoulian printed many stories about the pipeline's 
need. In toto, they shared a dominant characteristic of the federal 
studies: an abundance of contradictory statements and information. 
Any confusion the contradictions created was fed by the diversity 
of events the paper covered that provided information about the
1Ibid.
2Ibid., Sept. 1, 1979, p. 11.
3Jhid., Oct. 6, 1979, p. 1.
pipeline's need. Some o f  the information relevant to the question 
appeared in stories that didn't mention the p i p e l i n e , 1 but those 
articles which weren't tied directly to efforts to assess the p r o j e c t 1 
need presented much information.
The year 1979 opened with the rejection of a certificate of 
need by the Minnesota Energy Agengy for the Northern Tier pipeline.
The action received front page coverage in a story saying, "Northern 
Tier would not have a big enough crude oil m a rket to make the 
pipeline p r ofitable ."2 John Millhone, director of the agency, said 
the pipeline would need to ship about 600,000 barrels a day to be 
profitable. But deficit projections at the time forecast a daily 
shortage of only about 100,000 barrels: by 1980 and fewer than 500,000 
barrels in the ye a r  2000.
The article also said Millhone based his decision to reject 
the permit on the deficit projections and on two other factors: a
new pipeline (Northern Pipeline) might be built from Illinois to 
Minnesota, connecting the state's primary refinery center with Gulf 
Coast s u p p l i e r s , 3 and the Canadian cutoffs, originally scheduled for 
1981, would be delayed until 1985. There were few other references.
1An example is the article, "Gas Shortage, Oil Glut Coexist 
in California," Missoulian, May 6, 1979, which gave a good description 
of the surplus— its causes and impacts— yet said nothing about 
Northern Tier.
2Missoulian, Jan. 11, 1979, p. 1.
3The Northern Pipeline received the Minnesota Certificate of 
need in 1977. At the time of Minnesota's rejection of Northern Tier, 
Northern Pipeline still had to receive approval from several other 
states.
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to the size of the deficit; mos t  that did appear in the paper used 
figures from federal reports.
At a public hearing Oan Rappe said,
Our whole national energy plan is based on conservation. That 
will not, however, be fostered by pumping 900,000 barrels of oil 
down a pipeline into states with a shortfall of only 160,000 
barrels or less.1
In a letter in mid-1980, figures from Cardullo's draft report and
the Department o f  I n t e r i o r ’s study were used to argue against the
pipeline. The letter also said the Northern Pipeline would take care
of most of Minnesota's crude oil needs: "Minnesota, which has the
lion's share of the projected shortfall, will most likely receive all
the oil it needs from a new pipeline [the Northern P i p e line]. "2
Several articles provided figures for the Canadian exports
and cutbacks. These were, to some extent, indications of the size
of the deficit. One, in October 1979, gave considerable information,
including the amount of Canadian oil Montana refineries had and were
using. The article said that (1) as much as 41.4 percent of the
153.000 barrels of crude oil Montana refineries can handle each day 
has come from Canada, (2) Canada's exports had dropped from 55,000 to
14.000 barrels a day and (3) Cenex had depended on Canadian oil for 
53.5 percent of its crude oil, Conoco for 60 percent, Exxon .for 23 
percent and Phillips for 31 p e r c e n t . 3
1Ibid., Jan. 29, 1979, p. 1.
2Ibid., June 22, 1980, p. 4.
3Ibid., Oct. 4, 1979, p. 1.
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In another article Michael Curran, then president of the 
pipeline company, said, "We were importing more than one million 
barrels per day from Canada, but that had been cut down to about
200,000 barrels daily n o w . " 1 Curran made his remarks six months 
before the October article appeared. A final reference to the amount 
of oil Canada traditionally had supplied the state appeared in an 
article that quoted Montana Gov. Thomas Judge, who said that in 
1978 Canada supplied Montana with 45 percent of the crude oil used 
in the state's refineries .2
Regardless of the size of the deficit, its effect was the 
most important concern. What would a deficit of crude oil mean to 
the people in the region? As important as the question was, there 
was little specific information about it in the Missoulian. There 
were a number of references implying a deficit was bad without saying 
specifically why. For example:
1. Northern Tier will "help provide a steady supply of 
domestic crude that we so desperately need" (Montana Rep. Ron 
M a r l e n e e ) . 3
2. "Those of us living in the Midwestern part of the United 
States will be in need of crude oil and would like to see construction 
[of Northern Tier] commence at the earliest possible date" (North 
Dakota Gov. Arthur L i n k ) . 4
1Ibid., April 9, 1979, p. 2.
2Ibid., Jan. 20, 1980. p. 3.
3Ibid., June 24, 1979, p. 2.
kIbid., F e b .  1, 1 9 8 0 ,  p.  10.
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3. Northern Tier is a "national necessity. . . .  We have to 
get that oil to the Midwest" (Idaho Sen. Frank C h u r c h ) . 1
4. "There is a critical deficit of efficient means of 
transporting crude oil into this region, which the Northern Tier 
will alleviate" (Max Deibert, Northern Tier co n s u l t a n t ) . 2
5. "It is clear that some arrangement will be made to get
Alaska oil from the West Coast to the Midwest" (Sam Reynolds,
Missoulian editorial page e d i t o r ) . 3
Some people were saying or implying that a shortage of crude 
oil would affect the availability o f  diesel and gasoline. Explaining 
his support for Northern Tier, Gov. Judge said, "Anyone who experienced
the diesel fuel shortage last summer can understand the need to help
meet this state's future energy r e q u i r e m e n t . A  representative of 
the Helena Chamber of Commerce said at a meeting where the organization 
endorsed Northern Tier, "As an agricultural state, anyone can see the 
w isdom of c o n t i n u i n g  supplies of crude for our s t a t e . " 5
Sen. Melcher, in letters and articles, said several times 
that without a new supply system to Billings, the state would run short 
of petroleum products. A June 1979 letter said,
'ibid., Feb. 17, 1980, p. 18.
2Ibid., July 15, 1980, p. 4.
3Ji>id., Feb. 11, 1979, p. 4.
**Ibid., Jan. 20, 1980, p. 13.
5Ibid., J a n .  5, 1 9 8 0 ,  p .  8.
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Preventing the acute current shortage of petroleum products 
from becoming chronic means that our refineries must be assured 
of stable crude oil supplies. Despite doubts that may have been 
raised in some minds, environmental experts rate oil pipelines as 
the best method of transporting petroleum.1
Jan Rappe answered Melcher's letter 19 days later:
Sen. Melcher, in his opening remarks, implies that Montana 
now has a diesel shortage because new pipelines are being delayed. 
The issues are, of course, unconnected.
Using oil industry figures, a group of economists from Energy 
Action in Washington, D.C., arrived at the following facts: we
have more crude oil in the [United States] this year than last 
year yet we have less refined products. Why? Certainly for the 
present we do not have the shortage of crude oil that pipeline 
proponents would have us believe.2
Other statements by Sen. Melcher in the Missoulian follow:
1. Montana and other states have much at stake for assurance 
of petroleum supplies for trucks, tractors, trains and cars.3
2. Unfortunately, so much time has already been wasted on 
the Northern Tier line permits that we face petroleum shortages 
in Montana and other Northern Tier states right now. The 
situation will be much more serious when farm field work starts.**
3. I shall not ignore the fact that we need to make sure of 
a stable source of crude oil supply after 1981 for Montana's 
citizens and its basic industries, including agriculture. [If 
Northern Tier is not environmentally acceptable], we will still 
have to look for other alternatives for getting petroleum into 
our area.5
By sending a Billings Gazette editorial to the Missouliccn as 
a letter to the editor, Melcher had the following statement printed:
1Ibid., June 3, 1980, p. 4.
2Ibid., June 22, 1980, p. 4.
3Ibid,, April 13, 1979, p. 8.
''ibid.
5Ibid., May 29, 1980, p. 4.
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The pipeline company's "patience is much greater than that of 
motorists waiting in the gas pump lines across the area they wish 
to s e r v e . " 1
The Surplus
Missoulian readers interested in the phenomenon called the 
oil glut found substantial information in the paper in 1979 and 1980. 
The combination of letters, editorials and articles presented 
historical, current and future views of the West Coast surplus.
Most of the important questions about the glut were addressed.
The origin of the surplus was explained in a column, a letter and 
an article.
Don Schwennesen's column provided the first explanation of 
the surplus. Writing about S. 968, Melcher's bill to accelerate the 
federal review process for Northern Tier, Schwennesen said:
S. 968 represents the same kind of hasty congressional 
decision-making that allowed the Alaska pipeline to be built in 
the wrong place, causing the West Coast oil surplus that the 
Northern Tier pipeline supposedly would solve.
Melcher also was a sponsor of the 1973 legislation that 
authorized the building of the Alaska pipeline and that headed 
off court appeals.
xMelcher introduced the Gazette editorial as follows:
At the moment, there is an interesting difference of opinion 
within the Lee newspaper family in Montana which, I am sure, does 
not indicate a family feud but is a matter of interest. One of 
the Missoulian’s sister papers in the Lee group in Montana, the 
Billings Gazette, recently published an editorial very favorable 
to the Northern Tier pipeline. Another Lee newspaper, the 
Independent Record at Helena, regarded it as worthy to be 
reprinted and did reprint it. . . .
Believing that the viewpoint of these two Lee papers is 
newsworthy under the circumstances, and would be of interest to 
Missoulian readers, I write this "Letter to the Editor." 
Missoulian, July 31, 1979, p. .4.
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Congress approved that measure by a wide margin, even though 
critics at the time argued that the pipeline would cause a West 
Coast oil surplus and was designed to allow export of Alaska oil 
to Japan.
To allay those fears, Melcher also supported a provision in the 
Alaska pipeline measure that prevents export of Alaska crude 
oil.1
When authorization of the Alaska pipeline was being debated, 
opponents of the Prudhoe-Valdez route argued that a trans-Canada 
route would take the oil where it was n eeded— the M i d w e s t — and avoid 
a possible West Coast surplus. In a letter by pipeline critic 
Mavis McKelvey to the Missoulian describing Melcher's efforts to 
aid the trans-Alaska pipeline, the fate o f  this route was discussed.
Sen. Walter Mondale, who favored a trans-Canada pipeline from 
Alaska to the Midwest, introduced an amendment that called for an 
independent study by the National Academy of Science that would 
compare the economic and environmental consequences of a 
trans-Alaska and a trans-Canada pipeline. It was rejected.
The committee's justification for its action was summed up 
in the following paragraph from its report: "Regardless, whether
the 1969 decision of the owner companies in favor of an all-Alaska 
route was the wisest or most consistent with the national interest 
at that time, and regardless whether the administration's early 
commitment in favor of the route was made on the basis of adequate 
information and analysis, the committee determined that the 
trans-Alaska pipeline is now clearly preferable because it would 
be on stream two to six years earlier than a comparable overland 
pipeline across Canada."
Professor Les Pengelly of the University of Montana brought an 
article about the surplus to the attention of the Missoulian, which 
printed it on the editorial page. It was entitled "Alaska Oil Like 
a Wandering T r i b e . " 3
1JJbid., May 13> 1979, p. 17.
zIhid., June 1, 1979, p. 5.
3The article originally appeared in the 1979 fall-winter 
edition of the Alaska Conservation News.
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Long ago when ordinary people were naively debating the best 
way to get Prudhoe oil to market, an economist with a funny name 
and a Naknek legislator with a sense of humor suggested a pipeline 
down the Alcan Highway to the Midwest.
Meanwhile, a consortium already had bought pipe from Japan 
to build a line to Valdez so that's the way it was, take it or 
leave it in the ground folks, and soon Alaskan newspaper editors 
went into paroxisms if anyone even mentioned alternatives. No 
maple leaves would ever shake our tree.
Today Prudhoe crude is burbling its costly way from Valdez to 
Texas via Panama and Alaska's profits have shrunk to a poultry 
sum. In a word, the goose is laying brass eggs.1
In a letter, Rappe explained where Alaska-produced oil was
goi n g :
In the first three months of 1978, 46 percent of the Alaska oil 
was absorbed on the West Coast. Only 2.7 percent stayed in 
Alaska. The remaining 51.3 percent was and is being shipped 
through the Panama Canal to the Gulf States.2
Rappe also said the glut wasn't excess oil as its name implied: "To
say that there is: a 'glut' of oil is misleading. Alaska oil is not 
accumulating in ever-increasing quantities on the West C o a s t . " 3
An incisive description of the glut was given in a wire 
service story explaining why California had a gas shortage and an 
oil surplus:
About 400,000 barrels a day of Alaskan oil is shipped aboard 
tankers that pass off California’s coast on a route from the 
Valdez terminal of the trans-Alaska pipeline to a transshipment 
station at sea west of Panama. It is transferred to small tankers 
that carry the oil through the Panama Canal to Gulf Ports..
This is the portion of Alaska's Prudhoe Bay field production 
that is surplus. It is owned by Standard Oil [Company] [OhioJ, 
which is a subsidiary of British Petroleum. Neither [British. 
Petroleum] nor Sohio has significant refining capacity or
1Missoulian, June 25, 1979, p. 4.
2Ibid., April 19, 1979, p. 4.
3 Ibid.
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marketing facilities in.the West, and the oil must be taken where 
the markets are. Federal law prohibits export of any oil that 
moves through the trans-Alaska pipeline.
It is this oil that is described as "glutting" the California 
market. It never gets ashore here.
Meanwhile, the Western markets have absorbed about 800,000 
barrels a day of the Alaskan oil.1
The article gave figures on how much the other Prudhoe Bay producers 
withdrew from the field and used and concluded, "Only Sohio and 
[British Petroleum] have a problem with the alleged 'glut.'."2
While the size of the surplus was not being debated in the 
paper, two other aspects of the issue were: (1) what problems did
the glut create and (2) how large would it be in the future? The 
first question was answered differently in 1979 than it was by 
mid-1980. In 1979 the glut problem was that the extra expense of 
shipping it to the Gulf Coast was cutting into producers' profits, 
and it was feared Alaskan production might be restricted.
In April 1979 an economic consultant who specialized in 
energy testified at a committee hearing by the Washington State 
House o f  Representatives. His testimony was printed on the 
Missoulianrs editorial page in October 1979:
All the proposals for east-to-west oil pipeline systems, are 
directed firstly at the surplus of crude oil on the United States' 
West Coast created by the increase in Alaska production. The 
present necessity to ship that oil through the Panama Canal to 
Gulf and East Coast ports costs about $2 per barrel relative to 
sales on the West Coast or in the Far East. When this charge is 
added to the high transportation cost on the [trans-Alaska] 
pipeline, the revenue left to pay for the oil itself is not 
enough to justify developing any more of the already discovered 
resources on the North Slope of Alaska.
1Ibid.r M a y  6, 1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1.
2 Ibid.
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The official ceiling price for Alaska North Slope crude is more 
than $11 per barrel, but the 1978 average was only about $5, with 
some shipments to the East Coast netting less than one dollar. The 
surplus not only reduces the incentive to develop new oil in 
Alaska, but also results in shutting in known oil reservoirs in 
California.1
There were shorter references to the high cost and resulting 
disincentive of shipping the oil to the Gulf Coast:
Although there is a ready market for this oil at refineries in 
the Middle West and Gulf states, the oil's owners incur 
considerable financial loss because they must pay transit costs 
that are much higher.2
Two-thirds of the oil potential in Alaska can't be developed 
unless there is a market for the oil.3
Following the abandonment of the Sohio pipeline, which would have 
taken Alaska oil from Long Beach, Calif, to Texas, a wire service 
story said, "Its abandonment means that the eastern part of the 
country will not be able to reduce its oil imports significantly 
through increased Alaskan p r o d u c t i o n."u
Arguments that the glut was restricting oil production in 
Alaska ended by 1980. The reason was a survey of West Coast 
refineries by Sen. Henry Jackson's office. The results, which 
appeared in the paper several times, surprised many.
The Missoulian in October 1979 ran an Associated Press story 
that said there wasn't enough Alaska oil available to West Coast 
Refineries:
1Ibid., Oct. 12, 1979, p. 4.
2Ibid., May 6, 1979, p. 1.
* Ibid., April 9, 1979, p. 8.
4Ibid., March 11, 1979, p. 8.
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Oil producers' unwillingness to divert Alaska oil.now being 
shipped to the Gulf Coast casts doubt on the need for a West to 
Midwest oil pipeline, according to a congressional study. . . .
Three West Coast refiners have permits to expand their 
refineries to use more Alaska crude, Jackson said, but .they "are 
not going ahead now because they cannot get the supply."1
The Associated Press story appeared two days before Secretary of 
Interior Andrus endorsed Northern Tier. Four days after Andrus' 
announcement he said there might not be enough Alaskan oil to supply 
the p i p e l i n e . 2
The Wall Street Journal explained in February 1980 why the 
surplus had disappeared and the Missoulian printed several pieces 
about that article. The editorial page printed two articles about 
it. One was by Reynolds:
Remember that famous glut of Alaska oil on the West Coast?
So much oil was backed up that the United States had to dig a 
trench 1,500 miles long from Port Angeles, Wash, to Clearbrook, 
Minn., right through the Missoula Valley (not to mention other 
fragile areas of Montana) to get the oil to the Middle West.
It was too expensive to deliver the Alaska oil by tanker 
through the Panama Canal to Gulf of Mexico ports, where it could 
then be piped to Midwest refineries.
Remember all that? Well, none of it is true any longer.
There is no glut on the West Coast. And shipping Alaska oil 
through the Panama Canal is now cost efficient. . . .
The reason: some West Coast refineries modified their
equipment to handle more Alaska high-sulfur oil. Others expanded 
existing capacity. They were spurred by the decline of production 
in the lower 48 states and the uncertainty and high cost- of 
supplies from foreign sources.
But the price of oil from Alaska's Prudhoe Bay is controlled 
by the government. That has made it a bargain to West Coast 
refiners. In addition, it has made it highly profitable to ship 
the oil by tankers through the Panama Canal to the Gulf Coast.
1Ibid., Oct. 14, 1979, p. 1.
ZIbid., Oct. 20, 1979, p. 2.
6 1
The result: West Coast refiners, can't get as much. Alaska crude as
they would like and are equipped to handle. The glut has 
vanished.1
No refutation of the apparent demise of the oil glut appeared in the 
paper. A passing shot at the glut was: m ad e  in March 1980. A letter 
quoting the Wall Street Journal and describing why the glut 
evaporated said that all the West Coast refineries n ow wanted the 
Alaskan oil: "Everyone wants. It's sort of like the ugly duckling
that turned into a beautiful s w a n . " 2
1Ibid.t F e b .  2 6 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p .  4.
2Ibid.t M a r c h  1 0 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p .  4.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Projects the size and complexity of the Northern Tier 
pipeline present formidable problems for local news media. The 
profusion of information (much of it conflicting), the issue's 
changing status and its international scope made it difficult even 
for expects to understand it and stay abreast of it. Northern Tier 
was a whirlpool of voices and texts spewing figures, opinions and 
predictions that became jumbled in time, significance, context, 
fact and fiction.
For editors and reporters who deal with dozens of issues and 
events simultaneously under the "crushing influence of the c l o c k , " 1 
delving deeply into the web of Northern Tier seldom was possible.
What would have helped the Missoulian most in its coverage of the 
pipeline? Publisher Tom Brown said,
More reporters and time. That's the age-old limitation in a 
newsroom: You have only so many reporters and so much time and
so much money to spend. And Northern Tier required more than we 
sometimes had.2
Nevertheless, this study suggests that the paper's approach to 
reporting restricted the coverage as much as did its limited resources.
1Philip L. Geyelin and Douglas Cater, American Media: Adequate
or Not (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1970), p. 55.
2Personal interview with Tom Brown, op. cit., July, 1982.
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The Missoulian appeared passive in most of its efforts to 
gather and provide information about the pipeline. The paper was more 
a mirror of events and statements than a participant in the generation 
of information. Many questions were not answered in its pages. Many 
confusing situations and conflicting data were left unexplained and 
much relevant information was not reported. Many of the flaws in the 
paper's coverage could have been avoided had it dug a little or had 
it given its readers more of the available information. The telling 
symptom of this passive approach is the scarcity of investigative 
and explanatory elements in the paper's Northern Tier stories.
The Missoulian1s Investigation
Many journalists say investigative reporting is special 
because it involves an effort to uncover wrongdoing. Bob Green of 
Newsday defined investigative reporting as "the publishing of 
significant material that someone is trying to h i d e . " 1 Leonard 
Sellers said the investigative reporter "goes after information that 
is deliberately hidden, and the information is hidden because it 
involves a legal or ethical w r o n g . " 2
For many environmental issues, which may require persistent 
probing by reporters, this definition is too narrow. Often .the 
environmental story is not about mistakes or wrongdoing. Information
1Bruce Locklin, "Investigative Reporting: Defining the
Craft," Nieman Reports, Winter/Spring, 1978, p. 28.
2Leonard Sellers, "Investigative Reporting: Methods and
Barriers" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University,
1974, in The Mass Media, William L. Rivers, ed., 2nd ed. New York:
Harper and Row, 1975), p. 234.
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may be hidden but not necessarily by design. Much of the relevant 
information about Northern Tier wasn't concealed by unscrupulous 
officials; it was hidden in the smokescreen of the issue's complexity.
A better description of the type of reporting Northern Tier 
required probably is depth reporting, what Neale Copple of the 
University of Nebraska said was "telling the reader all the essential 
facts in a way that brings the story into the reader's e n v i r o n m e n t . 111 
Getting the facts often requires what seems a useful definition of 
investigative reporting: "an aggressive digging into rea l i t y . " 2
The Missoulian missed or delayed reporting man y  essential 
facts because it didn't search for them. Some of them were well 
hidden and difficult, maybe impossible, to dig out. Others would 
have emerged with the first investigative probe. For example, amid 
the debate about the plight of some refineries if Northern Tier was 
not built, a debate in which plant closures and widespread fuel 
shortages were forecast and refuted, one pertinent voice was a b s e n t —  
the refinery representative, the person critically concerned and 
involved with crude oil supply and demand.
In 1979 and 1980 the Missoulian did not print a story, 
editorial or column in which representatives of oil refineries told 
of their needs. The nonspecific cries of politicians were given play, 
as were the countering voices o f  the pipeline's foes, but these were
1Neale Copple, Depth Reporting (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 21.
2Bruce Locklin, Nieman Reports, op. cit., p. 28.
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indirect observers. The question of the refineries' need for the 
pipeline was a crucial consideration. If those plants had alternative 
supplies, the threats of lost jobs and fuel shortages were misguided.
If, however, refinery managers said there were no economic alternatives 
to a new pipeline, Northern Tier's proposal would gain considerable 
validity.
What were the positions of Montana's seven refineries? In 
1980 the manager of each refinery said Northern Tier's fate would 
have no influence on his plant's operation and that, while the 
pipeline could provide an alternative, optional supply source, use 
of it would depend on the tariffs charged and the type of oil the 
pipeline d e l i v e r e d . 1 That is one example where the paper failed to 
do a simple investigation that probably would have helped clarify 
a concern repeatedly debated in the paper.
Another example involves coverage of the eminent domain issue.
As noted, the paper's first mention that Northern Tier had eminent 
domain was in a story about a public hearing at which someone said 
the pipeline company could condemn private land in Montana. Three 
weeks later Mercher said in a Missoulian interview that this was 
incorrect— that the company did not have condemnation powers.
The paper did not try to settle the dispute by calling the 
Public Service Commission. It w a s n ’t until after the paper printed 
a letter explaining how and when Northern Tier had acquired eminent
^ n  the spring 1980 I interviewed the managers of Montana's 
seven refineries for an article I was preparing.
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domain, and Melcher had admitted he was wrong, that the Missoulian did 
its research. Five weeks after the public hearing story and nine 
months after Northern Tier acquired eminent domain, the paper reported 
that "Northern Tier Pipeline [Company] received the power to condemn 
private land in Montana . . . last y e a r . " 1
The paper appeared willing to quote people but less ready to 
verify the accuracy of the statements. Sometimes this allowed biased 
spokesmen to have the only voice in the paper about particular aspects 
of the issue. The Missoulian ran four articles about the first study 
by the Department of Energy on the need for a new West to East pipeline. 
The report was unfavorable to Northern Tier. Two o f  the stories gave 
brief details of the study. The other two were largely concerned with 
Melcher's contention that the report was "pathetic," and the work of 
"amateurs.."2 Six months later the second Department of Energy report 
supported the pipeline. The only reference in the paper about the 
validity of the study's findings was a comment by, Peter Funk, a vocal 
pipeline foe, who called the report "awful, just terrible. . . . y ou 
could hire a high school person who could write t h i s . " 3
These reports supposedly contained the best information 
available about the pipeline's need, but the p u b l i c ’s perception of 
quality and reliability was left to the mercy of people whose 
credibility was questionable. Were the studies done poorly? If so,
1Missoulian, April 14, 1979, p. 3.
2Ibid., Feb. 23, 1979, p. 1.
3Ibid., Aug. 6, 1979, p. 11.
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did this mean the federal government had inadequate information on which 
to base its judgment of the pipeline proposal? Were Melcher's and 
Funk's statements exaggerations? If not, what was wrong with the 
reports? The Missoulian and its readers needed answers to those 
questions.
By printing statements without checking the substance behind 
them, newsmen may miss important stories that would emerge through 
routine checking. This happened in the paper's account of the amount 
of control Montana had over the pipeline. Eight months before the 
Missoulian's apparent discovery that Montana could neither stop nor 
significantly control construction of the pipeline, it printed two 
stories quoting people who said the state had very little power over 
Northern Tier.
In August 1979 the paper reported a speech by Peter Funk of 
the Environmental Information Center. Funk said the state's only 
control over the pipeline was through about 30 minor permits regulating 
how the line would cross roads, streams and state lands— that the 
permits were little more than guidelines for construction, setting 
limits on the company's a c t i v i t i e s . 1 Several weeks later, Dave Oanis, 
who was responsible for drafting the state's Northern Tier impact 
statement, said in another article, "The state's only concern in this 
matter is issuing permits to the project for highways, streams and 
state land c r o s sings. "2 He also said the state could not prohibit
hcbid. , A u g .  6 , 1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1 1 .
2Ibid. , A u g .  1 8 ,  1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1.
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construction because the pipeline didn't qualify for review under 
Montana's key environmental law. There were no follow-up articles 
telling whether or not Funk and Janis were correct.
It wasn't until April that the paper seemed to discover the 
state's lack of control over the pipeline. That information came 
with the release of Janis' final impact statement. Then the 
Missoulian ran a front page story about the lack of state power 
and a page two story saying what pipeline opponents had known for 
m o n t h s — that the state had little say over Northern T i e r . 2 Two days 
later an editorial denounced the state's impotence and urged the next 
state legislature to remedy the situation.
The paper understandably treated this as big news, but it had 
the information nine months earlier. If the Missoulian had been 
looking for the facts its readers needed to understand the 
significance of the pipeline, Funk's or Janis' statements would 
have signaled that something important had surfaced.
These examples show that reporting, without investigating, 
can result in superficial coverage, and that investigations often 
can be no more than checking facts. Environmental stories like 
Northern Tier need depth reporting. Without it, the maze of figures, 
comments and contentions m a y  present a confusing, shallow picture.
The two Department of Energy studies, called pathetic and awful, 
had widely different conclusions. One said there was no need for a
lIbid., April 24, 1980, p. 1.
2Ibid., p. 2.
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new pipeline because crude oil deficits would be minor. The other 
maintained that at least one new pipeline was needed to avert 
massive oil shortages. The Missoulian reported the gist of each, 
but it didn't analyze on its own the quality or validity of the 
reports.
Even after the paper finally reported the weakness in the 
state's regulatory laws regarding pipelines, it didn't find out how 
such loopholes originated or what effect they were likely to have on 
the quality of the pipeline's construction. When public issues 
involve contradictions, a constant search for and reporting of the 
truth is essential to inform the public. By neglecting research, 
by primarily providing the claims and counterclaims, charges and 
reassurances, the Missoulian sometimes supplied the ingredients for 
confusion, not understanding.
The Missoulian's Attempt .to Explain the Issue
Besides its lax effort to dig out information, the Missoulian 
did little to explain the facts that were revealed or to analyze 
d iverse stories. Many stories were fragments of a broad collage 
that needed to be organized and interpreted. Many journalists today 
accept the need for explanations in news stories. Markel said,
News is the report of a contemporary event or trend— a 
report that supplies background and explanation, that avoids 
partisanship and propaganda and that indicates, as far as 
possible, the truth.1
tester Markel, What you don't Know Can Hurt You (Washington, 
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1972), p. 166.
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The Missoulian provided explanations with gusto only once. 
Mostly, the paper's attempt to explain the issue in its news articles 
was limited to rare labeled news analysis, an occasional story that 
gathered a collection of already-reported facts into a single piece 
and a few wire service stories that explained incongruities of the 
issue. Few of the news stories by the paper's staff carried 
explanatory elements beyond a perfunctory description of the pipeline, 
such as "Northern Tier is a proposal to build a 1,500-mile crude 
oil pipeline from Port Angeles, Wash, to Clearbrook, M i n n . " 1
Two characteristics of the issue created the need for frequent 
explanations: one was its complexity. The West Coast oil glut, for
example, one of the simpler aspects of the issue, was a product of 
Alaska oil production, the ban on its foreign sale, the limitations 
of West Coast refinery capacity, the lack of inland transportation 
systems and the relative cost of shipping Alaska oil to the Gulf 
Coast through the Panama Canal. To understand the glut, one must know 
the relationship of each of these other situations.
Explanations in the news stories were needed because of the 
long period during which the story developed. Northern Tier evolved.
Its myriad components surfaced piecemeal. While many of those pieces 
alone justified news stories, readers periodically needed to have them 
gathered up, sorted and put into enlightening perspectives.
Coverage of S. 968 might have misled some readers because 
the major provisions of the bill, instead of being presented in a
1Hypothe tical example.
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single story, were revealed in installments. The measure was designed 
to (1) advance the deadline for the completion of the federal impact 
statement, (2) speed up a key federal decision and (3) limit legal 
protests by prohibiting court challenges to the federal decision about 
the pipeline and by setting a 60-day limit for constitutional 
challenges against the bill.
Coverage of S. 968 was poor partly because the components 
of the bill came out in the paper over six weeks. The only time the 
Missoulian listed the major provisions together was in an editorial 
printed the d ay the bill was to be heard in Congress. That editorial 
was the paper's final mention of the measure.
That the bill somehow would limit citizen access to the 
courts was reported in April 1979, and mentioned several times in the 
next six weeks. It wasn't, however, until the middle of May that the 
paper, in a Don Schwennesen column, explained how access would be 
restricted. Schwennesen's column was printed the.day before the 
bill was to be heard. Until then the Missoulian's coverage of this 
aspect of the measure was condensed to "court challenges to the impact 
statement would be l i m i t e d " 1 and the bill would expedite "court 
procedures for any court cases as a result of this special p r o c e d u r e . 1,2
Where the paper failed most in its coverage of S. 968 was in 
not explaining the substance of the bil l — how it would expedite the 
permitting process and restrict legal activity. The Missoulian
1Ibid., April 13, 1979, p. 11.
2Ibid., May 4, 1979, p. 4.
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described the decision in several ways: (1) a "federal decision on
the proposed Northern Tier p i p e l i n e , " 1 (2) a decision about "which if 
any pipelines to carry Alaska crude oil to the middle west will be 
a p p r o v e d " 2 and (3) an action taken by the Secretary of Interior on the 
final impact st a t e m e n t . 3 The decision was the key element in S. 968. 
Whatever it was, Melcher, the bill's author, apparently felt it 
important or questionable enough to protect it from court action.
The coverage implied the decision was a blanket federal 
approval for Northern Tier to start laying pipe. It wasn't. The 
decision was a selection of which of four pipeline proposals would 
receive special federal processing instituted by Title V of the Public 
Utilities Regulatory Act of 1978. To understand S. 968, readers needed 
background of Title V, which was introduced by Melcher and passed two 
years before S. 968 was proposed. Without a knowledge of Title V, 
readers could not fully understand Melcher's new bill.
Reporting spot news items without providing relevant 
background often does little more than alert readers that something 
is happening. Sometimes the important aspect is found in the 
background, which m a y  give reasons for the consequences of or the 
solution to an isolated event first noticed by a newsman. For 
example, in mid-1979 an odd forecast was made by the Department of 
Interior. The Missoulian reported that a draft Department of Interior
1Ibld., June 7, 1979, p. 8.
2Ibid., June 1, 1979, p. 5.
3Ibid., May 1, 1979.
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report predicted a large net surplus of oil in the 11 Northern Tier 
states and that Michigan, Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, where most of 
the region's refinery capacity is, would have more than 600,000 
excess barrels of oil a day by the ye a r  2000.
An oil surplus during a period of dwindling supplies is 
extraordinary, especially for largely nonoil-producing states, but 
no reasons were given by the paper. That was unfortunate because an 
explanation would have provided some insight into one of the most 
misunderstood aspects of the issue. The surplus wasn't an 
overabundance of oil but excess transportation capacity in the same 
states Northern Tier officials designated as their primary market 
area.
The Department of Interior was saying that an expected drop 
in demand for oil would cause existing pipelines feeding Midwestern 
and Northern Tier refineries to be underused. Had.the paper explained 
the bases for the bizarre sounding prediction, readers would have been 
able to better understand that the proposal for a new pipeline 
depended on increasing demands for oil. This would have simplified 
a complex situation and related the need for a pipeline to crude oil 
needs in the Midwest.
Explanatory articles also are needed for stories with, no news 
pegs. Such was the case for one of the most pertinent concerns of the 
Northern Tier issue. Arguments about the likelihood of a crude oil 
shortage were of secondary importance to the question of what would 
happen if refineries couldn't get enough oil. Most forecasters 
agreed that Montana would not have enough crude oil by 1990, but no
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one explained what this would mean. Would the price of petroleum 
products skyrocket? Would there be any increase? Would farmers and 
motorists, as Sen. Melcher and Gov. Judge hinted, run out of fuel? 
Perhaps there would be shortages of home heating oil. With the 
exception of a few quotations, mostly from politicians, the 
Missoulian did not report this central concern or raise the questions.
To make a rational decision about whether or not the pipeline 
should be built, the public needed to be able to weigh the pipeline's 
impacts against the benefits. This information was not easy to obtain. 
It wasn't in federal or state reports. It's possible that no credible 
material was available about the consequences of an oil shortage, but 
the questions should have been raised and attempts made to answer 
them. Perhaps all the paper could have done was provide scenarios 
or draw comparisons with previous oil shortages; but, by omitting 
any mention of what its readers could expect if no pipeline were 
built, only the loose implications of politicians received attention.
The benefits derived from explanatory reporting are evident 
from the times the paper did provide such details. A New York Times. 
news service article headlined "Gas Shortage, Oil Glut Coexist in 
C a l i f . " 1 gave a cogent explanation of how there could be long lines 
of cars bidding for scarce supplies of gasoline while there were 
long lines of oil tankers reluctantly bypassing the West Coast on 
their costly way to Texas. This article helped to explain the 
perplexing phenomenon and causes of the oil glut.
lIbid., M a y  6, 1 9 7 8 ,  p .  8.
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In July 1981 a Missoulian reporter wrote a four-part series 
describing the main issues involved in the pipeline. He wrote about 
the environmental dangers, the company's strategy to win final 
approval and to make a profit and he discussed the arguments about 
the pipeline's need. The series gave readers a concise, clear 
overview.
The paper printed a few articles that, while having a hard 
news peg, primarily were a potpourri of scattered pipeline items 
introduced by transitions such as "meanwhile," "in addition," and 
"on another front." These articles didn't directly explain particular 
aspects of the pipeline; but, by combining items reported separately, 
often months apart, readers could receive a broader view of the issue.
Northern Tier was confusing in part because it was a 
continually changing issue. The companies that made up the consortium 
often changed as did their proposal. Too, the supply of and demand 
for crude oil in the country, on which the pipeline's need rested, 
underwent dramatic changes after 1979. By simply reporting news items 
as they appeared, without providing background reasons or explaining 
the changed context under which the new information emerged, the news 
value of ma n y  stories was diminished. This is evident in much of 
the Missoulian's treatment of Northern Tier.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
It's easy to look at a newspaper's performance on a particular 
issue and find flaws: questions that weren't asked or answered,
cases where a reporter was misled or failed to give a needed 
explanation, scant coverage given an important topic while trivia 
received broad play. The lapses in the Missoulianrs treatment of 
Northern Tier are not, however, as important as the reasons behind 
them.
Rating his paper's performance on the pipeline, publisher 
Brown said, "We did a good job. We put in a lot of time. We put in 
an awful lot of stories on i t . " 1 Missoulian correspondent Richard 
Eggert, who wrote dozens of stories about the pipeline, said, "I'd 
rate the coverage as good. The local issues concerning western 
Montana we covered very well indee d . " 2
If Northern Tier primarily was a local issue and one were 
rating straight, hard news stories with well-defined pegs, the paper's 
performance was good. But Northern Tier primarily was a nonlocal issue 
and good reporting involves more than a display o f  immediate facts.
News isn't a collection of facts anymore than a disease is a list of 
symptoms. Most newsmen know this. Eggert defined news as "the
1Personal interview with Tom Brown, op. cit., July, 1978.
2Personal interview with Richard Eggert, Missoulian 
correspondent, Missoula, Mont., July, 1978.
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everyday element in a free society that permits people to make valid 
democratic d e c i s i o n s . " 1 This takes more than hard news stories. It 
requires background material, explanations and a sifting of information 
to find significant information.
Brown said the goal of his paper was "to try to cover Northern 
Tier in the kind of depth that would allow people to know and make 
intelligent decisions about it. To have a public opinion based on 
some knowledge instead of just e m o t i o n a l i s m . 1,2 But the Missoulian 
often failed to do that because it was content to act as a mirror, 
displaying only what was put before it. The excuse for this passive 
approach is that deeper, more thorough reporting is an unavoidable 
casualty of the ceaseless pressure to gather, decipher, process and 
disseminate the great volume of information that newsmen encounter 
daily.
"Time is a t y r a n t " 3 in journalism, but it doesn't have 
absolute rule. It would have taken little time to call a refinery in 
Billings to learn about its position concerning the pipeline's need 
or to check statements saying the state had little power over the 
line. The Missoulian printed eight stories about Sen. Melcher's
S. 968, but it never explained what the bill would do.
iIbid.
2Personal interview with Tom Brown, loc. cit.
3Richard Harwood, "Can Newsmen Do Better on the Facts?" in 
Of the Press, By the Press, For the Press, and Others Too, Laura 
Longley Babb, ed. (Atlanta: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 12.
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The four-part explanatory series by a Missoulian reporter 
undoubtedly was time consuming, but it did more to inform the public 
than a dozen other articles. When Melcher admitted he was wrong 
when he said the pipeline company didn't have eminent domain, the 
newspaper said,
The senator said the problem in finding the statute occurred 
because it was filed with laws relating to the state's Public 
Service Commission rather than eminent domain. (The Missoulian 
. . . quickly found the law in question by looking under Pipeline 
in the general index of the Revised Codes of Montana).1
The information about the company's eminent domain power was not 
difficult or time consuming for the senator or the paper to acquire.
They just had to look.
The fundamental aim of journalism is noble, but newsmen can 
lose sight of their objectives. The habits o f  expediting the 
editorial process can cause newsmen to cover only the easily pegged 
stories and to depend on what Philip Foisie of the Washington Tost 
called "contrived" news: hearings, communiques, speeches and
procedural court m a n e u v e r s . 2 Journalists cannot treat many of today's 
issues in this way and provide all the necessary information.
There is no question that we live in volatile times, that 
the economic, political and environmental systems of our society are 
becoming more interdependent, and that the potency of our technologies 
hold increasingly graver threats. The interdependence of our social
1 Missoulian, April 14, 1979, p. 3..
2Philip Foisie, "A DEW Line on the News," in Of the Press, By 
the Press, For the Press, and Others Too, Laura Longley Babb, ed. 
(Atlanta: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 234.
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systems means that communities cannot be isolated havens. The world 
is shrinking because the individual's environment is expanding.
If the press is to keep the public informed about the events 
that affect it the most, the news media must develop methods to acquire 
and process far more information than in the past. This particularly 
is true for small dailies. Reporters cannot rely on the straight, 
hard news format or be content to cover only what happens in their 
vicinities. Our shrinking world is becoming complex and is erasing 
community boundaries.
The Missoulian is a medium-sized daily. It has limited 
resources and cannot afford correspondents in all the areas from 
w hich relevant local news is generated. Like the rest of the news 
media, however, it must recognize that today's world demands much more 
o f  the press. It must realize that the routines of journalism that 
suffice for some traditional local beats work poorly for many broader 
issues.
The responsibility of the press has grown and, as George F.
Will has explained, how the press fulfills its responsibility will 
affect the health of our society:
This nation's premise is that history is made not by impersonal 
forces but individuals' choice. However, since 1933 the choices 
have been becoming complicated faster than journalism has been 
becoming capable of clarifying complexities. Because history 
here is the history of the minds of free persons, the quality of 
the history we shall make in the next 50 years depends to an 
unprecedented, and perhaps dismaying, extent on the quality of 
journalism.1
1George W. Will, Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1983, p. A-19,
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